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Civilizing Pornography: The Case For An Exclusive 
Obscenity Nuisance Statute 
Doug Rendlemant 
Criminal penalties are increasingly perceived to be too se-
vere for regulating obscenity. Professor Rendleman shares this 
perception and suggests that we replace criminal obscenity 
laws with an exclusive civil sanction utilizing injunctions. He 
proposes a comprehensive nuisance statute and discusses the 
various issues that arise in the equitable regulation of 
pornography. 
If there ever was a consensus in American society about the 
proper role of the government in controlling pornography, that con-
sensus is breaking down. To be sure prosecutors continue to enjoy 
popular support for pursuing the distributors of obscenity. But the 
distributors have become emboldened by their own commercially 
lucrative, if silent, public support, and by the growing conviction 
among civil libertarians that any form of restriction on the availabil-
ity of sexually explicit expression to consenting adults is incompati-
ble with the first amendment. 1 In the face of this eroding consensus, 
the law, at least at the state legislative level, is moving slowly but 
inexorably toward less instrusive methods of regulating obscenity.2 
t Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. The author drew on fifteen years' 
experience as a motion picture projectionist. Richard Foster and Barbara Jones, research 
associates, helped to prepare this article. 
1 This is the position of Justice Brennan in McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 678 
(1976) (concurring opinion); and in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 83-85 (1973) 
(dissenting opinion). Justice Tobriner articulates this view forcefully in his dissent in Bloom 
v. Municipal Court, 16 Cal. 3d 71, 86-100, 545 P.2d 229, 239-48, 127 Cal. Rptr. 317, 327-36 
(1976). 
2 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.2 (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. ConE§§ 12.1-27.1-01 
to 27.1-12 (Repl. Vol., 1976). 
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As Justice Tobriner of the California Supreme Court has remarked 
about resistance to this change, "the would-be legislative and judi-
cial King Canutes must fail in ordering back the waves of a cultural 
revolution. " 3 
In the absence of a cultural consensus, the practice of imposing 
criminal penalties for the distribution of pornography seems harsh 
and anachronistic. A number of states have begun to supplement 
criminal punishment with civil sanctions.4 This article advocates 
that the states go one step further, and abandon criminal penalties 
in favor of an exclusive civil remedy providing for injunctive relief 
against obscenity. Civilizing pornography through obscenity nuis-
ance actions would temper the harshness of the cultural conflict. It 
would also provide an appropriate way station in the process of 
cultural transformation. 
The article does not discuss the issues involved in defining con-
stitutionally suppressable obscenity.5 Others have addressed the 
definitional problems with skill and erudition.6 Rather, the focus is 
3 Bloom v. Municipal Court, 16 Cal. 3d 71, 99, 545 P.2d 229, 248, 127 Cal. Rptr. 317, 
336 (1976) (dissenting opinion). 
' Thus, civil actions have been brought against theaters, see, e.g., N.D.D., Inc. v. Faches, 
385 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Iowa 1974); Airways Theater, Inc. v. Canale, 366 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1973); Grove Press, Inc. v. Flask, 326 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Ohio 1970), vacated, 413 U.S. 
902 (1973); and against bookstores. See, e.g., Speight v. Slaton, 415 U.S. 333 (1974); Classic 
Distribs., Inc. v. Zimmerman, 387 F. Supp. 829 (M.D. Pa. 1974); People v. Goldman, 7 Ill. 
App. 3d 253, 287 N.E.2d 177 (1972); State ex rel. Blee v. Mohney Enterprises, 154 Ind. App. 
244, 289 N.E.2d 519 (1972); Giarrusso v. New Orleans Book Mart, Inc., 304 So. 2d 734 (La. 
Ct. of App. 1974); McNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1975); State ex rel. Field v. Hess, 
540 P.2d 1165 (Okla. 1975). Some actions have been brought against both theaters and 
bookstores. See, e.g., General Corp. v. Sweeton, 365 F. Supp. 1182 (M.D. Ala. 1973), vacated 
and remanded sub nom. MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799 (1975); People ex rel. Busch v. 
Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, &50 P .2d 600, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, cert. denied, 429 
u.s. 922 (1976). 
5 See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), in which the Supreme Court 
enunciated the following test for determining whether expression is constitutionally unpro-
tected obscenity: 
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average person, 
applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a 
whole, appeals to the prurient interest ... ; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, 
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state 
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value. 
I d. at 24. The Court provided the following examples ofthe types of specifically defined sexual 
depictions that could be proscribed under part (b) of the test: 
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, nor-
mal or perverted, actual or simulated. 
(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory 
functions, and lewd exhibitioq of the genitals. 
Id. at 25. 
• See, e.g., F. ScHAUER, THE LAw OF OBSCENITY 69-166 (1976); Lockhart, Escape from the 
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on the consequences of different ways of regulating unprotected 
obscenity. The article begins by considering the case against crimi-
nal regulation. It concludes that a civil remedy is preferable, and 
proposes a civil statute that displaces criminal obscenity laws. The 
issues involved in equitable regulation of obscenity are then dis-
cussed in light of the proposed statute. Particular attention is given 
to the need to reconcile equitable regulation with the constitutional 
proscription of prior restraints. 
I. ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS FOR REGULATING OBSCENITY 
Societies regulate repugnant conduct in a variety of ways, rang-
ing from criminal sanctions to social ostracism and moral condem-
nation.7 This article is concerned with the relative merits and de-
merits of the two most commonly encountered legal sanctions for 
the dissemination of obscenity-criminal punishment and civil in-
junctions. 
The differences between criminal and equitable regulation may 
at first seem inconsequential. Both establish a legal rule forbidding 
certain conduct and impose unpleasant consequences upon a viola-
tor-criminal punishment or contempt-for the infraction of this 
rule. 8 The differences are even more elusive when the legislature 
adds a statute to the criminal code allowing the state to seek injunc-
tions of criminal obscenity.9 Injunctive control of obscenity, the 
Supreme Court has understated, "is more akin to a criminal prose-
cution than are most civil cases."10 
There are, however, at least four important differences between 
injunctions and criminal regulation. First, the civil procedure fol-
lowed in obtaining injunctive relief is not encumbered by the special 
barriers created for the protection of criminal defendants, barriers 
that reflect the preference of our system for freeing the guilty rather 
than convicting the innocent. Of particular importance are the 
guarantee of trial by jury and the requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, neither of which is found in a proceeding in 
equity.11 
Second, an injunction, unlike a criminal statute, is personal-
ized and precise. An injunction singles out the defendant, identifies 
Chill of Uncertainty: Explicit Sex and the First Amendment, 9 GA. L. REv. 533 (1975). 
7 See H. PACKER, THE LtMrrs OF THE CRtMlNAL SANCTION 320 (1968). 
• See id. at 18-21. 
• See, e.g., N.D. CENT. ConE§§ 12.1-27.1-01 to 27.1-12 (Rep. Vol. 1976). 
•• Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975). 
11 See People v. Lim, 18 Cal. 2d 872, 880, 118 P.2d 472, 476 (1941). 
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the discrete material that is obscene, and warns the defendant to 
cease distributing this material. A criminal statute, in contrast, 
provides only a generalized warning to all the world phrased in 
terms of an abstract definition. 
Third, an injunction is directed toward regulating future con-
duct instead of punishing past conduct.12 An injunction in effect 
requires two violations before the state may punish the violator. As 
a result, after being enjoined, the defendants go home; after losing 
a criminal prosecution, they may not. Moreover, although some 
stigma and economic loss undoubtedly attach to being enjoined, 13 
the social and financial impact of incarceration is undoubtedly 
greater. 14 Thus, most potential offenders would prefer an injunction 
to a criminal conviction, with its potential loss of liberty and other 
collateral consequences. 15 
Fourth, the sanctions for violation differ. Although criminal 
contempt for breach of an injunction is manifestly retributive, 16 
contempt in general is not congruent with criminal punishment. 
Rather, contempt shares the remedial flexibility that characterizes 
all forms of equitable relief. When a defendant violates an injunc-
tion, the court may impose compensatory sanctions, designed to 
restore a wronged party to the status quo, or coercive sanctions, 
designed to achieve complianceY At the same time, contempt has 
a draconian aspect not shared by penal sanctions. The court asks 
only two questions in a contempt proceeding: Did the contemnor 
know of the injunction? And did the contemnor violate the 
injunction? If these questions are answered in the affirmative, the 
collateral bar rule allows the court to punish the contemnor even if 
he was engaged in constitutionally protected conduct. 18 This seems 
harsh. But if a defendant has received notice of the injunction and 
has had a full opportunity to litigate its issuance, the collateral bar 
in contempt is not too great a price to pay for orderly decision-
making and respect for the courts. 19 
12 See Littleton v. Fritz, 65 Iowa 488, 496-97, 22 N.W. 641, 646 (1885). 
" Cf. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1310 (6th Cir. 1974) (appellants claimed injunction 
endangered their livelihood). 
" See H. PACKER, supra note 7, at 36. 
" See 0. F:!ss, INJUNCTIONS 154 (1972); R. RANDALL, CENSORSHIP OF THE MoviES 147-50 
(1968); c. REMBAR, THE END OF OBSCENITY 228 {1968). 
u Cf. Maita v. Whitmore, 508 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1974) (sixth amendment right to jury 
trial in contempt proceedings for violation of injunction to be determined by same standards 
applicable to criminal offenses). 
11 D. DoBBS, REMEDIES § 2.9 at 98-101 (1973). 
18 Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 {1967). 
" See Rendleman, Toward Due Process in Injunction Procedure, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 121. 
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A. The Case Against Criminal Sanctions 
The criminal approach to the control of obscenity seems more 
repressive and anachronistic every day. Perhaps the major problem 
is that obscenity doctrine is simply too arcane and unpredictable to 
support criminal sanctions. As Justice Douglas has asserted, "to 
send men to jail for violating standards they cannot understand, 
construe and apply is a monstrous thing to do in a Nation dedicated 
to fair trials and due process."20 Justice Stevens has also recently 
added his voice to those critics who contend that the line between 
offensive and inoffensive communication is too blurred to identify 
criminal conduct. 21 
The severity of criminal sanctions is itself partly responsible for 
the unpredictability of obscenity law. Merchants cannot learn what 
is forbidden until the factfinder has rendered its verdict, but be-
cause few are willing to risk imprisonment, the precise standards 
delimiting protected and unprotected sexually explicit expression 
remain largely unknown. Undoubtedly, distributors are inhibited 
from disseminating sexually explicit material that would not ulti-
mately be found to be obscene. 
Criminal penalties not only have a chilling effect on first 
amendment rights, they also impede the effective suppression of 
genuine obscenity. Because of our solicitude for personal liberty and 
our desire to protect individuals from state power, we have encum-
bered the criminal law with prophylactic rules. These rules increase 
the complexity of criminal prosecutions, and suppressable obscenity 
may escape interdiction because the authorities have violated a 
defendant's procedural rights. Moreover, criminal proceedings are 
expensive and protracted, and officials may decide that scarce pro-
secutorial resources are better spent elsewhere. 
Criminal laws against obscenity also share the disadvantages of 
sumptuary laws in general. Consumption of pornography, like con-
sumption of liquor, narcotics, or the services of prostitutes, is a 
"victimless" crime, in which there is no harmed person to complain 
to the authorities. To enforce this type of law, the authorities must 
participate in the forbidden commerce. This leads to unseemly and 
overreaching enforcement tactics22 and diverts police from protect-
But see In re Berry, 68 Cal. 2d 137, 155-56, 436 P.2d 273, 285-86, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273, 285-86 
(1968) (collateral bar dropped). 
20 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 43-44 (1973) (dissenting opinion). 
21 Smith v. United States, 97 S.Ct. 1756 (1977) (dissenting opinion). See also Ward v. 
Illinois, 97 S.Ct. 2085 (1977) (dissenting opinion); Marks v. United States, 97 S.Ct. 990, 996 
(1977) (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
22 See H. PACKER, supra note 7, at 151. 
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ing people and property. 
Moreover, there is some evidence that sumptuary criminal stat-
utes actually stimulate crime. Prohibition illustrates that when the 
legislature declares a commodity illegal, a criminal market devel-
ops. The criminal sanction, by increasing the risk to sellers, de-
creases the number of sellers in the market and raises the price of 
the forbidden commodity. The sellers may then use the profits from 
their quasi-monopoly to corrupt the enforcers or finance other crimi-
nal enterprises.23 
Criminal proscriptions often repose on the statute books long 
after they have become superannuated by the passage of time or by 
conscious hypocrisy. However, society informally tolerates much 
that it formally forbids and it is possible to argue that these statutes 
are justified for their symbolic value, incorporating aspirations or 
ideals that society fails to observe strictly. The response to this line 
of reasoning is twofold. First, widespread violation of unenforced 
legislation draws the rest of the law into disrepute. Second, leaving 
largely unenforced statutes on the books creates the potential for 
abuse of prosecutorial discretion through selective enforcement 
against minorities or politically disfavored groups.24 
Civil remedies would not eliminate all of the difficulties gener-
ated by the use of criminal sanctions. But civil jurisdiction would 
ameliorate most of the adverse consequences produced by criminal 
regulation. Before turning to consideration of the civil alternatives, 
however, a closer examination of the unique dangers of a regime 
allowing both civil and criminal sanctions is required. 
B. The Perils of Dual Sanctions 
Several states supplement criminal penalties for the regulation 
of pornography with equitable remedies. Parallel sanctions are not 
unique to obscenity regulation. At the turn of the century, dual 
remedies existed to curb both saloons and houses of prostitution, 
nuisances that involve cultural conflict, a forbidden commodity, 
and a victimless offense, as does modern obscenity. But as applied 
to pornography the solution of parallel remedies contains a potential 
for prosecutorial harassment that could easily chill free expression. 
For this reason dual remedies for obscenity are unwise, and legisla-
tures would be well advised to repeal criminal obscenity and replace 
it with an exclusive civil statute. This conclusion is supported by 
23 Id. at"278-79. 
21 See generally K. DAVIS, PoLICE DISCRETION (1975). 
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examining obscenity litigation and the relationship between crimi-
nal and civil actions. 
The requirement that an equitable judgment be obtained be-
fore beginning a criminal prosecution for obscenity has often been 
hailed as a way of curing the inherent vagueness of criminal obscen-
ity statutes, 25 for declaratory judgments or injunctions allow obscen-
ity to be determined without the immediate threat of criminal sanc-
tions. Justice Douglas has argued that "until a civil proceeding has 
placed a tract beyond the pale, no criminal prosecution should be 
sustained."26 The President's Commission on Obscenity and Por-
nography recommended that a civil declaration normally be a prere-
quisite for a criminal prosecution.27 And because of the "in terrorem 
effect"28 of criminal sanctions, a majority of the Supreme Court 
approved the use of prior civil procedures to determine whether the 
material sought to be suppressed is protected by the first amend-
ment.29 
Instead of requiring the bookseller to dread that the offer for 
sale of a book may, without prior warning, subject him to a 
criminal prosecution with the hazard of imprisonment, the 
civil procedure assures him that such consequences cannot fol-
low unless he ignores a court order specifically directed to 
him .... 30 
Civil notice decreases self-censorship and advances a first amend-
ment goal-the "dissemination of constitutionally protected litera-
ture."31 
However, adding a civil remedy brings an additional weapon to 
the prosecutorial arsenal. When public passion against "filth" runs 
high, the authorities not infrequently single out particular purve-
yors and concentrate prosecutorial resources on them. The reporters 
are replete with examples of multiple seizures and arrests.32 Regard-
:zs See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 42-43 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); 
McNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343, 350 (Mo. 1975) (Seiler, C.J., dissenting and concurring 
in result); UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, THE REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 63 (1970) [hereinafter cited as COMM'N ON 
OBSCENITY]; F. SCHAUER, supra note 6, at 197-98. 
21 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 41 (1973) (dissenting opinion). 
27 CoMM'N ON OBSCENITY, supra note 25, at 63; Lockhart, supra note 6, at 569. See also 
MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 28I (Supp. 1977). 
21 Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 442 (1957). 
21 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 55 (1973). 
"' Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 442 (1957). 
31 McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 683 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
32 See, e.g., Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 404 F. Supp. 33,46-56 (S.D. Tex.1975). 
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less of the outcome, a series of legal actions burdens the merchant 
with uncertainty and attorney's fees. A period of sustained pressure 
may result in a "gentlemen's agreement" between a merchant and 
the authorities, or may result in the merchant acceding to self-
regulation, the most effective form of prior restraint. Multiple suit 
harassment may even destroy a small and vulnerable business. 
Furthermore, when multiple remedies are available, nothing 
prevents the authorities from maintaining contemporaneous actions 
against a defendant. The authorities may proceed, in single or in 
separate actions, with as many legal theories as they possess: zoning 
violations, building code infractions, public nuisance, and criminal 
charges. 33 But nuisance or other civil actions are more than merely 
another string for a prosecutor's bow. Since nontestimonial civil 
evidence can frequently be used in a later criminal prosecution, 3~ 
defendants may suspect, perhaps accurately, that the authorities 
have resorted to equity to discover for the criminal prosecutor. An 
equitable proceeding may also be an end in itself if it allows ex parte 
procedure or injunctions that close a nuisance down, 35 or it may be 
a refuge from juries and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Normally res judicata and, to a lesser extent, stare decisis pro-
tect a defendant from a plaintiff's multiple suit harassment. Brief 
examination shows, however, that res judicata provides scant pro-
tection against harassment where dual remedies are available. One 
reason for this is that the regionally variable standard of obscenity 
adopted by Miller v. Califomia36 dilutes the res judicata and prece-
dential value of all obscenity judgments. Because obscenity turns 
on the way the audience perceives the material instead of on the 
material itself, a judgment's effect may be limited to the territory 
occupied by that audience.37 Something legally obscene in Washing-
ton, North Carolina, may be standard fare a few hundred miles 
33 See, e.g., Llewelyn v. Oakland County Prosecutor's Office, 402 F. Supp. 1379 (E.D. 
Mich. 1975). 
•t See, e.g., Taylor v. State ex rel. Kirkpatrick, 529 S.W.2d 692, 697 (Tenn. 1975); N.D. 
CENT. ConE § 12.1-27.1-06(4) (Rep!. Vol. 1976). 
35 See, e.g., State v. Gulf Theatres, Inc., 270 So. 2d 547, 555-57 (La. 1972) (Tate, J., 
dissenting), vacated and remanded, 412 U.S. 913 (1973), rev'd. on remand, 287 So. 2d 496 
(La. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974) . 
•• 413 u.s. 15 (1973). 
37 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.2(0 (Supp. 1975) (judgment not res judicata 
outside judicial district); United Theatres of Florida, Inc. v. State, 259 So. 2d 210, 212 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1972), modified, 323 So. 2d 309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (injunction against 
showing of obscene materials may not run throughout the state); State ex rel. Little Beaver 
Theatre, Inc. v. Tobin, 258 So. 2d 30,32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1972) (same); F. SCHAUER, supra 
note 6, at 221. 
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north in Washington, D.C.38 Thus, a regional or national distributor 
of sexually explicit material often cannot obtain a definitive answer 
to the question whether particular material is obscene. 
Where parallel remedies are permitted, the order in which civil 
or criminal proceedings are brought and the outcome of the initial 
proceeding are also of critical importance in determining the res 
judicata effect of the prior judgment. A prior successful criminal 
prosecution may ease a later civil action to enjoin an obscenity 
nuisance. In some jurisdictions, statutes provide that criminal con-
viction is either conclusive proof!9 or prima facie evidence40 that a 
nuisance exists.4' And under standard preclusion doctrine the state 
may employ res judicata to enjoin a convicted criminal defendant 
from continuing to exhibit or sell the matter litigated and deter-
mined to be obscene. 42 
On the other hand, an unsuccessful prior criminal prosecution 
may have no effect on a later civil suit, for the state's failure to show 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial does not preclude 
it from &ttempting, in a later civil action, to meet the less rigorous 
preponderance standard.43 Nevertheless, the Iowa Supreme Court, 
in a liquor nuisance appeal, held that a criminal acquittal precluded 
the state from maintaining an equitable suit to condemn the liquor 
as a nuisance. 44 Professor Vestal criticized this decision for ignoring 
the differing standards of proof.45 Perhaps the Iowa court interposed 
the shield of res judicata through concern for the policies that re-
quire a plaintiff to elect his remedies and that forbid splitting a 
cause of action-repose for the defendant, the preservation of scarce 
"' See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 (1973); United States v. McManus, 535 F.2d 
460, 464 (8th Cir. 1976); McNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343, 347-48 (Mo. 1975); Edelstein & 
Mott, Collateral Problems in Obscenity Regulation: A Uniform Approach to Prior Restraints, 
Community Standards, and Judgment Preclusion, 7 SEroN HALL L. REv. 543, 569-70 (1976) . 
., See, e.g., ALA. CoDE tit. 7, § 1107 (1960); IND. CoDE § 35-30-10.5-10 (1973). 
•• See, e.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3767.05 (1953). 
" Though a provision of the latter type was attacked in an Ohio case as reversing the 
burden of proof, the state had there already proved obscenity beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
the owner had had an opportunity and the incentive to contest the criminal charge. Grove 
Press, Inc. v. Flask, 326 F. Supp. 574, 579 (N.D. Ohio 1970). 
" See Raleigh v. United States, 351 A.2d 510 (D.C. Ct. App. 1976); A. VESTAL, RES 
JUDICATA PRECLUSION V-374-78, V-411 (1969); Edelstein & Mott, supra note 38, at 583; F. 
ScHAUER, supra note 6, at 219-22. Some states vest the criminal court with power to enjoin 
the obscenity upon the entry of the criminal judgment. See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-
105 (1973). 
'
3 See State ex rel. Threlkeld v. Osborne, 207 Iowa 636, 223 N.W. 633 (1929); A. VESTAL, 
supra note 42, at V-368; Edelstein & Mott, supra note 38, at 584-85. 
" State ex rel. Hanrahan v. Miller, 250 Iowa 1358, 96 N.W.2d 474, 477 (1959). 
" A. VESTAL, supra note 42, at V-370. 
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judicial resources, and the protection of citizens from harassment. 
But the Iowa decision is an exception to standard preclusion doc-
trine. 
What effect does a judgment for the defendant in a civil injunc-
tion action have on a later criminal prosecution? Here the preclu-
sion rules should combine with res judicata to bar the second law-
suit. If the government fails to prove obscenity by a preponderance 
of the evidence, then the court should forbid it from attempting to 
prove the same issue beyond a reasonable doubt. 46 
Finally, there is the troubling question of the effect of a judg-
ment of obscenity in an earlier civil action on a later criminal case. 
As we have seen, because the civil action's warning features obviate 
much of the uncertainty of obscenity law, the use of prior civil 
judgments appeals to many. But there are a number of difficulties 
with this approach. 47 Under traditional res judicata principles, when 
the government wins a civil nuisance suit, it cannot take advantage 
of that decision in a later criminal prosecution for the same conduct. 
Proof by a preponderance of the evidence in the earlier nuisance 
action falls short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal 
prosecution. 48 In some jurisdictions a civil judgment creates a pre-
sumption of guilt or establishes an element of the crime. 49 But the 
state must prove each element of a criminal case beyond a reasona-
ble doubt50 and must allow the criminal defendant the opportunity 
to confront and cross-examine the state's witnesses. 51 "In light of the 
command of the First Amendment," Justice Brennan reminds us, 
"a standard of proof by a mere preponderance of the evidence poses 
too substantial a danger that protected material will be erroneously 
suppressed. " 52 Thus, in order to bind a later criminal prosecution, 
the burden of proof in the civil case should equal or exceed proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.53 Moreover, while a criminal defendant 
is entitled to demand a jury trial, the civil nuisance may be judge 
tried; and res judicata doctrine cannot be used to deprive defen-
dants of a jlWJ trial on an issue properly triable to a jury. 54 
" See A. VESTAL, supra note 42, at V-368; Edelstein & Mott, supra note 38, at 584. 
47 See generally People v. Lim, 18 Cal. 2d 872, 118 P.2d 472 (1941). 
•• A. VESTAL, supra note 42, at V-366; Edelstein & Mott, supra note 38, 582-83. 
" See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 28H (Supp. 1977) (civil action creates 
conclusive presumption of lrnowledge of book's obscenity); VA. ConE § 18.2-384(13) (Repl. 
Vol. 1975) (civil action establishes scienter). 
50 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
51 See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965). 
52 McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 685 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
53 I d. at 687. 
51 See Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59, 63-64 (5th Cir. 1970) (relying on Beacon Theatres, Inc. 
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An important recent decision directly bearing on this problem 
is McKinney u. Alabama, 55 in which the Supreme Court unani-
mously struck down a state statute that permitted material pre-
viously declared obscene in a civil action to be introduced in a 
criminal proceeding, with the criminal defense limited to whether 
the material had been knowingly sold. Since the defendant had not 
been a party to the civil action, he was effectively precluded from 
refuting the charge that the material was obscene. The Court viewed 
with grave misgivings any procedure that purports to bind a later 
determination unless everyone the state presumes to bind by the 
first procedure receives notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
Although an earlier civil action should not have a preclusive 
effect in a later criminal prosecution, there are at least two other 
ways in which a civil judgment may lead to the imposition of puni-
tive sanctions in a later proceeding. First, the civil judgment may 
be admissible and relevant in a criminal trial as tending to prove 
scienter-that the merchant was aware of the nature of the material 
in question. 56 Second, if the civil decision is an injunction, subse-
quent criminal prosecution does not prevent the state from also 
punishing the defendant for contempt. 57 The palpable unfairness of 
this double barrelled sanction for the same conduct may not escape 
interdiction under the double jeopardy clause.58 
In summary, res judicata restricts some extravagances and 
ameliorates some injustices of a system of dual sanctions. But the 
availability of criminal prosecution to the government, the differing 
burdens of proof in civil and criminal trials, and the regional varia-
tions in the standard of obscenity all reduce the effectiveness of the 
shield of res judicata. So long as both civil and criminal remedies 
exist, multiple and harassing prosecutions are possible. This points 
to the desirability of a single sanction. Moreover, the procedural 
complexities under two systems argue for the relative simplicity of 
a single remedy. 
The potential for abuse created by a regime of dual remedies 
v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959)), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971). But see Crane 
Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 490 F.2d 332, 343 n.15 (2d Cir. 1973) . 
.. 424 u.s. 669 (1976). 
•• See generally C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE§ 318 (2d ed. 1972). 
•• See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 594 (1895). 
•• Cf. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (fifth amendment guarantee against double 
jeopardy embodies collateral estoppel as a constitutional requirement); Waller v. Florida, 397 
U.S. 387 (1970) (second trial in state court for offense based on same facts that supported 
conviction in earlier trial in municipal court constituted double jeopardy). But c{. Bartkus 
v. lllinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (due process does not bar state prosecution for violation of state 
criminal law after prior acquittal for federal offense involving same evidence). 
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could of course be eliminated by repealing either criminal or civil 
sanctions or both. The author assumes that society is not ready to 
substitute extralegal sanctions like ostracism and social condemna-
tion for legal coercion. And if a legal remedy is to be chosen, the 
advantages of criminal sanctions are outweighed by the advantages 
of civil sanctions. 
The costs of criminal obscenity were alluded to earlier: the 
unfairness of imposing criminal penalties in an area permeated with 
definitional vagueness and inconsistency, the complexity and ex-
pense of criminal prosecutions, and the victimless nature of obscen-
ity infractions. The benefits of criminal regulation of obscenity are, 
on the other hand, fairly elusive. Professor Lockhart has argued that 
the authorities need the criminal sanction because of the delay in-
herent in securing a "final" civil judgment. 59 But he underestimates 
the potency of injunctive relief, for protection against the distribu-
tion of obscenity need not await a "final" injunction. A court may 
enjoin the altering or transporting of allegedly obscene material 
immediately and without notice, 60 and may issue an interlocutory 
injunction against dissemination on short notice.61 A merchant who 
ignores these injunctions may be held in contempt. On the other 
hand, both civil and criminal procedure compel the state to let 
distributors of alleged obscenity remain open for business until an 
adversary adjudication has taken place.62 Thus, so long as the Con-
stitution demands certainty before expressive activity may be 
curbed, both civil and criminal jurisdictions will allow some unpro-
tected material to escape. 
Perhaps the strongest reason for retaining criminal statutes is 
the symbolic value of such statutes as an expression of a com-
munity's moral outrage with the purveyors of obscenity. Certainly, 
it would require great courage for a legislator to vote to repeal crimi-
nal obscenity laws. Perhaps it is for this reason that a complete 
break with the practice of regulating obscenity criminally has yet 
to be achieved. The President's Commission recommended that a 
civil declaration be a prerequisite for criminal prosecution, but 
would allow the authorities to proceed criminally first when mate-
rial is "unquestionably within" the category of obscenity. 63 Even the 
•• Lockhart, supra note 6, at 570-71. 
•• See text and notes at notes 158-166 infra. 
•• See text and notes at notes 150-152 infra. 
02 Cf. Heller v. New York, 413 p.s. 483, 492-93 (1973) (first amendment requires that 
seized film be returned or copied so that showings may continue pending adversary proceed-
ings). 
03 CoMM'N ON OBSCENITY, supra note 25, at 63; Lockhart, supra note 6, at 572. 
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new statutory approach adopted by North Carolina retains dual 
remedies, permitting criminal prosecution when a merchant persists 
in conduct that has previously been condemned in a civil proceed-
ing.64 However, in a period of waning consensus about the propriety 
of obscenity regulation, the moral symbolism of criminal prosecu-
tions seems unduly harsh and repressive. Certainly, if civil regula-
tion can be shown to be equally, or more, effective in actually con-
trolling the distribution of obscene material, we can well afford to 
abandon a symbol of a certitude that no longer exists. 
Today both parties in the cultural struggle over obscenity are 
united in favor of civil regulation-prosecutors disgruntled with the 
complexities of the criminal process and merchants and their liber-
tarian allies horrified by the prospect of imposing criminal sanctions 
on a bookseller. The merchants favor abandoning criminal sanc-
tions; the prosecutors, on the other hand, favor adding civil reme-
dies without disturbing the criminal sanction. However, if we are 
interested in effective regulation with a minimum of abrasion, the 
authorities need only a civil remedy. The most effective course is a 
fresh start: abolition of the harsh and anachronistic criminal sanc-
tion, and exclusive reliance on a more humane civil remedy. 
IT. THE NEED FOR STATUTORY REFORM 
One who expects to find little civil obscenity litigation will be 
surprised. The President's Commission reported in 1970 that eight-
een states had authorized in personam injunctions against obscen-
ity, and that five allowed in rem injunctions.65 Since then, civil 
actions against obscenity have reached reported decisions in at least 
twenty-four states, 66 and the Supreme Court has rendered several 
decisions on various aspects of obscenity nuisance. 67 
Although the majority of reported civil obscenity judgments are 
in personam, a minority of states have in rem obscenity nuisance 
statutes68 that permit a plaintiff to bring an action against the 
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.2 (Supp. 1975). 
15 COMM'N ON OBSCENITY, supra note 25, at 332. 
" According to the author's research, since 1970 declaratory judgments or injunctions 
involving obscenity have reached reported decisions in Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Califor-
nia, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Michigan, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Ten-
nessee, Texas, and Vermont. 
17 See, e.g., McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669 (1976); MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 
799 (1975); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 
(1975); Speight v. Slaton, 415 U.S. 333 (1974); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 
(1973); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972). 
'" See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, §§ 28C-28H (Supp. 1977); VA. ConE§ 18.2-
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"obscene" property itself.69 When in personam and in rem injunc-
tions are analyzed, however, the differences are not significant 
enough to compel separate treatment.70 
In rem orders, like in personam decrees, may be enforced in 
later contempt proceedings against a party. Moreover, in jurisdic-
tions having both criminal and civil sanctions for obscenity, an in 
rem decree, like an in personam judgment, may provide the basis 
for subsequent criminal prosecution.71 And constitutional safe-
guards apply to in rem and in personam injunctions alike.72 Thus, 
in McKinney u. Alabama73 the Supreme Court established that an 
in rem decision cannot attain a preclusive effect beyond the parties 
to the action or persons closely related to the parties. The practical 
effect of this ruling is to make the scope of in rem orders little 
different from that of in personam decrees. 
Yet, theoretically, in personam and in rem actions result in 
different remedies. In personam actions end with total abatement 
of the nuisance, or shutdown orders, while in rem actions proceed 
item by item. However, recent decisions overturning in personam 
shutdown injunctions on constitutional grounds have effectively 
destroyed this distinction. 74 Further, both in rem and in personam 
injunctions ameliorate the asperities and uncertainties of criminal 
prosecutions by resolving obscenity challenges civilly. The impor-
tant difference is not between in rem and in personam, but between 
civil and criminal. 
Many states have enacted nuisance statutes specifically de-
signed to control the distribution of pornqgraphy. 75 In other states, 
the authorities have sought injunctions against obscenity under 
"general public nuisance" laws not drafted with pornography in 
mind. Serious problems attend this latter practice. General public 
384(2)(a) (Repl. Vol. 1975). See generally F. SCHAUER, supra note 6, at 197-98. 
" See COMM'N ON OBSCENITY, supra note 25, at 332. 
70 One possible distinction is that a proprietor may face less personal stigma when the 
authorities place an allegedly obscene film or book on trial than when the proprietor is himself 
charged with distributing obscenity. 
71 See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 281 (Supp. 1977); VA. CoDE§ 18.2-384(13) 
(Repl. Vol. 1975). 
n See McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 674 (1976). 
73 McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669 (1976). See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. 
v. University Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971) ("Some litigants-those who never ap-
peared in a prior action-may not be collaterally estopped without litigating the issue.") 
(dictum). 
" See, e.g., New Riviera Arts Theatre v. State ex rel. Davis, 219 Tenn. 652, 660, 412 
S.W.2d 890, 894 (1967). 
75 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1 (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CoDE § 12.1-27.1-01 
(Repl. Vol. 1976). 
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nuisance laws suffer from vagueness, overbreadth, and procedural 
anachronisms that have little place in litigation that raises sensitive 
first amendment issues. 
The law imprecisely defines a nuisance as an unreasonable use 
of property that hampers another's use and enjoyment of property. 
Not surprisingly, the concept has earned the deprecating remark 
that a nuisance is "a good word to beg a question with."76 Tradition-
ally, nuisances have been divided into public and private: a public 
nuisance affects the public at large; a private nuisance affects only 
one individual or a limited group of individuals. Courts have held 
that the legislature may define what constitutes a public nuisance 
and confer equitable jurisdiction to abate it.77 
"Redlight" abatement statutes were generally enacted early in 
this century for the purpose of shutting down properties used for 
"lewdness, assignation, or prostitution."78 Through a two-step pro-
cess of extension, these statutes have been construed to include 
"lewd" entertainment, 79 and then, in some jurisdictions, bookstores 
and theaters exhibiting "lewd" fare. 80 This process of judicial exten-
sion is exemplified by the recent decision of the California Supreme 
Court in People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater. 81 The 
California public nuisance statute condemns activity that is 
"indecent" or "offensive to the senses."82 Refusing to distinguish a 
pre-World War I decision that abated "an attraction known as the 
'Sulton's Harem' conducted at the Panama-California International 
Exposition," the court could discern "no satisfactory distinction 
which would justify differential treatment of the pictorial represen-
tations in obscene magazines and films on the one hand, and 'live' 
71 Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REv. 317, 326 (1914). 
77 See, e.g., Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31 (1890); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 
U.S. 623 (1887); Carleton v. Rugg, 149 Mass. 550, 22 N.E. 55 (1889). 
7
' See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 100 1/2, § 1 (1975). The seminal statute was that oflowa. 
Law of April 3, 1884, ch. 143, § 12, 1884 Iowa Laws 146. See 20 CoLUM. L. REv. 605 (1920). 
71 See, e.g., Maita v. Whitmore, 365 F. Supp. 1331 (N.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd on other 
grounds, 508 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 947 (1975); People ex rei. Hicks 
v. "Sarong Gals," 27 Cal. App. 3d 46, 103 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1972); City of Chicago v. Geraci, 
30 Ill. App. 3d 699, 332 N.E.2d 487 (1975) (masturbatory massage parlor); Washington Post, 
Feb. 17, 1974, § 1, at 12, col. 7 (homosexual health club is nuisance per se) . 
.. See, e.g., MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799 (1975); General Corp. v. State ex rei. 
Sweeton, 294 Ala. 657, 320 So. 2d 668 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); Harmer v. 
Tonylyn Productions, Inc., 23 Cal. App. 3d 941, 100 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1972); State v. Gulf States 
Theatres, Inc., 270 So. 2d. 547 (La. 1972), vacated and remanded, 413 U.S. 913 (1973), rev'd 
on remand, 287 So. 2d 496 (La.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974). 
" 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Note, 
The Devil and the D.A.: The Civil Abatement of Obscenity, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1329 (1977). 
•: CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 370-371 (West 1957); CAL. Ctv. CODE §§ 3479-3480 (West 1970). 
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performances on the other."83 
At one level, decisions such as Busch can be faulted for extend-
ing judicial equitable powers without the explicit sanction of the 
legislature.84 As Justice Tobriner noted in his dissent, "courts of 
equity enjoy no roving commission to define public nuisances; they 
may abate only such nuisances as the Legislature declares."85 He 
further pointed out that the California Assembly and the state's 
citizens had recently rejected a proposal for injunctive control of 
obscenity;86 and he also stated that "there is no hint in the statutes 
or the cases construing them that conduct can constitute a public 
nuisance simply because some people stand philosophically opposed 
to it."87 Obscenity nuisances could not subsist under the public 
nuisance statute, he argued, because the nuisance was not public, 
the definitions were too vague, and the remedies were too severe. 
The inevitable response to such a sweeping interpretation would be 
self-censorship. 88 
More perceptive courts have refused to extend general public 
nuisance statutes to proscribe "lewdness" in books and movies.89 An 
Illinois court refused to extend a "lewdness" statute to enjoin the 
dissemination of pornography, observing that the statutory lan-
guage would not bear the freight. So long as "a word is known by 
the company it keeps," the court explained, the statute must be 
"aimed solely and only at houses ofprostitution."90 And other courts 
113 17 Cal. 3d at 50, 550 P.2d at 604, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 332. 
•• Cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116 (1976) (decision to deprive aliens of 
an important liberty must be explicitly made by Congress or the President). 
85 People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 63, 550 P.2d 600, 613, 
130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 341, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
•• 17 Cal. 3d at 70-71, 550 P.2d at 617-18, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 345. 
87 Id. at 66, 550 P.2d at 615, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 343. 
88 Id. at 72-74, 550 P.2d at 619-20, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 347-48 . 
., See, e.g., Southland Theaters v. State ex rel. Tucker, 254 Ark. 192, 492 S.W.2d 421 
(1973) ("roadhouse" does not include theater); Southland Theaters v. State ex rel. Tucker, 
254 Ark. 639, 495 S.W.2d 148 (1973) ("roadhouse" does not include theater); Mini Art Operat-
ing Co. v. State, 253 Ark 364, 486 S.W.2d 8 (1972) (statute declaring nudist colonies public 
nuisances cannot extend to movies depicting nudism); People ex rel. Busch v. Projection 
Room Theater, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328 (red light abatement law not 
intended to apply to exhibition of obscene magazines or films), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 
(1976); Harmer v. Tonylyn Productions, Inc., 23 Cal. App. 3d 941, 100 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1972) 
(distinguishing live shows); People v. Goldman, 7 Ill. App. 3d 253, 287 N.E.2d 177 (1972); 
State ex rel. Faches v. N.D.D., Inc., 228 N.W.2d 191 (Iowa 1975); State ex rel. Wayne County 
Prosecutor v. Diversified Theatrical Corp., 396 Mich. 244, 240 N.W.2d 460 (1976) (public 
nuisance statute inapplicable to theater where sexual acts are not committed but are por-
trayed); State ex rel. Murphy v. Morley, 63 N.M. 267, 317 P.2d 317 (1957); Napro Develop-
ment Corp. v. Town of Berlin, 376 A.2d 342 (Vt. 1977). 
" People v. Goldman, 7 Ill. App. 3d 253, 255, 287 N.E.2d, 177, 178-79 (1972). Accord, 
People ex. rel. Carey v. Route 53 Drive-In, 45 Til. App. 3d 81, 358 N.E.2d 1298 (Til. App. 1976); 
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have perceived that, although the first amendment protects live 
entertainment, enjoining representational works such as films and 
books raises more serious first amendment questions than does en-
joining a bawdy burlesque.91 The Arkansas Supreme Court, revers-
ing a trial judge who had enjoined nudist movies under a statute 
declaring nudist camps a public nuisance, pointed out that the 
silver screen had been used to depict, not to practice, nudism.92 
The most serious objection to applying general public nuisance 
statutes to pornography, however, arises from the overbreadth and 
vagueness problems created by such an extension. The possibilities 
of overbroad application are illustrated by the decision of an Ari-
zona court upholding the application of a general public nuisance 
statute to the showing of a sexually explicit film at a drive-in thea-
ter. 93 The court found that the possibility of exposure to children 
outside the theater rendered the exhibition a public nuisance. But 
not long after this decision, the Supreme Court in Erznoznik v. City 
of Jacksonville94 rejected the notion that different standards of de-
cency could be applied to drive-in movie theaters, in ruling uncon-
stitutional a statute specifically directed at the showing of sexually 
explicit but non-obscene films at drive-in theaters. Although the 
Arizona court could not be expected to have anticipated Erznoznik, 
its decision demonstrates how easily the public nuisance concept 
can stray into constitutionally protected areas. 
The vagueness of general public nuisance statutes is an even 
greater constitutional problem than their overbreadth.95 Miller v. 
California96 requires that the applicable standard of obscenity pro-
scribe the depiction of specifically defined forms of sexual conduct. 
This would appear to forbid injunctions obtained under common 
State ex rel. Murphy v. Morley, 63 N.M. 267, 317 P.2d 317 (1957). In City of Chicago v. 
Geraci, 30 lll. App. 3d 699, 332 N.E.2d 487 (1975), however, the court held that a masturba-
tory massage parlor was a specialized form of prostitution. Id. at 704, 332 N.E.2d at 492. 
11 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 464 Pa. 435, 461, 347 A.2d 290, 304 (1975) 
(construing "lewdness" to refer only to "illicit sexual conduct" obviates vagueness problem 
entailed if "lewdness" construed to include exhibition of obscene books and material), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). 
12 Mini Art Operating Co. v. State, 253 Ark. 364, 366, 486 S.W.2d 8, 10 (1972). See also 
State ex rel. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Diversified Theatrical Corp., 396 Mich. 244, 240 
N.W.2d 460 (1976) (public nuisance statute inapplicable to theatre when sexual acts are not 
committed but are portrayed). 
13 Cactus Corp. v. State ex rel. Murphy, 14 Ariz. App. 38, 480 P.2d 375 (1971) . 
.. 422 u.s. 205 (1975). 
•• See State ex rel. Murphy v. Morley, 63 N.M. 267, 271-72, 317 P.2d 317, 319-20 (1957); 
Gulf State Theatres, Inc. v. Richardson, 287 So. 2d 480, 489-92 (La. 1973) (court held that 
the statute created a prior restraint). 
" 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). See F. ScHAUER, supra note 6, at 164-66. 
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law nuisance acts, or redlight statutes. 97 But Miller also permits 
courts to construe state statutes as incorporating constitutional ob-
scenity standards. 98 The question then becomes under exactly what 
circumstances should a court read constitutional standards into ex-
isting law. 
Even where the relevant statute includes the word "obscenity" 
in some form, not all courts have been willing to construe it as 
involving constitutional standards. 99 Nevertheless, some courts have 
followed what can only be described as a tortuous route to find that 
even general public nuisance or redlight statutes also incorporate 
the applicable constitutional standards. For example, the Okla-
homa Supreme Court read "offends decency" in the public nuisance 
statute to include offenses under an obscenity statute, which in turn 
had been construed to incorporate the current constitutional stan-
dard.100 Thereafter, selling obscene material could be enjoined as an 
illegal act which offends decency. And the California Supreme 
Court read the public nuisance language "indecent or offensive to 
the senses" to encompass "obscene" as judicially and legislatively 
defined. 101 After this decision, California's total scheme is a little 
bizarre: "lewd" in the redlight act may not be used for obscenity but 
may be used against live entertainment; "indecent or offensive to 
the senses" may be used against obscenity, primarily because it had 
been previously used against live entertainment. 102 
In the shadow of these jerrybuilt constructions the attitude of 
Chief Justice Heflin of the Alabama Supreme Court is healthy. His 
position seems to be that courts may construe criminal obscenity 
statutes to be commensurate with the constitutional ebb and flow; 
but he registered skepticism as to whether the Alabama legislature 
intended the state's Redlight Abatement Act to be employed to 
control obscenity. By construing such a statute to incorporate con-
97 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 464 Pa. 435, 459, 347 A.2d 290, 303 (1975), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976) (quoting Grove Press, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 418 F.2d 
82, 88 (3d Cir. 1969)). 
•• 413 U.S. at 24 & n.6. 
•• Compare Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 404 F. Supp. 33, 39-42 (S.D. Tex. 1975), 
remanded on other grounds sub nom. Butler v. Dexter, 425 U.S. 262 (1976); State v. "The 
Bet," 219 Kan. 64, 70-71, 547 P.2d 760, 767 (1976); Magnum v. Maryland Bd. of Censors, 
273 Md. 176, 187-88, 328 A.2d 283 (1974) with Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 464 Pa. 435, 
443-46, 347 A.2d 290, 294-96 (1975); Theatre Guild, Inc. v. State ex rei. Rhodes, 510 S.W.2d 
258, 259-60 (Tenn. 1974). 
'"" State ex rei. Field v. Hess, 540 P.2d 1165, 1168-69 (Okla. 1975). 
101 People ex rei. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 56, 550 P.2d 600, 608, 
130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 336, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
102 ld. 
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stitutional standards, the court, he stated, "goes beyond the pale of 
permissible judicial construction and crosses over into the realm of 
exclusive legislative drafting .... " 103 Justice Heflin is surely cor-
rect; for if the legislature did not intend redlight and general public 
nuisance statutes to reach the dissemination of pornography, then 
obviously it did not intend that those statutes be read to incorporate 
the constitutionally mandated Miller standards. 104 Yet if these stat-
utes are not construed to incorporate such standards, they are un-
constitutionally vague. 
Other problems also inhere in applying general public nuisance 
doctrine to pornography. When nuisance doctrine evolved from 
liquor and prostitution regulation into obscenity regulation, it car-
ried a number of anachronisms with it. 105 For example, reputation 
testimony may be prima facie evidence of a public nuisance.108 
Clearly, admitting such evidence in an obscenity nuisance proceed-
ing would undermine the constitutional standard for obscenity and 
impermissibly reverse the burden of proof. 107 
In sum, unreconstructed redlight and saloon doctrine is too 
elastic, too imprecise, and too anachronistic to be used to close 
bookstores and theaters. To control the channels of communication, 
courts should proceed with constitutional procedure108 and constitu-
tional definitions of obscenity .109 "The sword of public nuisance," 
Justice Tobriner has remonstrated, "is a blunt one, admirably de-
signed to curb noxious odors or to quell riots, but ill suited to the 
delicate sphere of the First Amendment where legal overkill is 
fatal." 110 
ill. THE PROPOSED CIVIL OBSCENITY STATUTE 
Up to this point, the article has emphasized two main themes: 
1) If declaratory judgments and injunctions are to emerge as truly 
103 General Corp. v. State ex rel. Sweeton, 294 Ala. 657, 674, 320 So. 2d 668, 683 (1975) 
(concurring opinion), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976). 
101 Also see Justice Tobriner's dissent in People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Thea-
tres, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 63-74, 550 P.2d 600, 613-20, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 341-48, cert. denied, 429 
u.s. 922 (1976). 
105 See generally Gulf States Theatres, Inc. v. Richardson, 287 So. 2d 480, 491 (La. 1974). 
aoc See, e.g., IND. CoDE ANN. § 35-30-10.5-5 (1975). 
107 See text and notes at notes 208-213 infra. 
, .. See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 417-19 (1971); Oregon Bookmark Corp. v. Schrunk, 
321 F. Supp. 639, 641 (D. Ore. 1970); General Corp. v. State ex rel. Sweeton, 294 Ala. 657, 
663, 320 So. 2d 668, 673 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976). 
1
"' See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-25 (1973). 
110 People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 74, 550 P.2d 600, 620, 
130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 348 (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
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civilized remedies, legislatures should repeal criminal obscenity 
statutes and divorce civil obscenity from the criminal process. 2) 
Because present civil obscenity statutes are unfocused, ill-defined, 
and superannuated, legislatures should pass statutes specifically 
designed to regulate obscenity civilly. The following statute is sub-
mitted to advance these goals. 
1) The (courts of general jurisdiction) shall have jurisdiction 
to adjudicate whether matter disseminated within the (county) is 
obscene. "Disseminate" means to sell, lease, or exhibit or to hold 
with intent to sell, lease, or exhibit. [Alternative: "Disseminate" 
means to exhibit to the general public or where it can be perceived 
by a substantial number of people; or to sell, lease, or exhibit or hold 
with intent to sell, lease, or exhibit to (children).] "Obscene" 
means ( .... ). 
2) The (prosecuting attorney) may begin a civil action in the 
name of the state against any person or organization that dissemi-
nates any obscene matter. This action may be brought in any 
(county) where the alleged dissemination occurs. 
3) The (petition) shall describe with particularity the matter 
to be adjudicated, allege obscenity and dissemination, and seek 
remedies hereinafter provided. 
4) When the state presents its (petition) the court may, with-
out notice to the defendant, grant a restraining order forbidding the 
defendant from altering the matter, disposing of it entirely, or trans-
porting it out of the (county). 
5) The court may grant a preliminary injunction against dis-
semination following notice to the defendant and a hearing sched-
uled to begin twenty-four or more hours after the defendant receives 
notice. 
6) The court shall not require the state to post security before 
granting an interlocutory order. But if (the trial or appellate court) 
enters a final judgment that the matter is not obscene, or if the state 
dismisses the suit voluntarily before final judgment, then the court 
may award to any party incorrectly subjected to an interlocutory 
order the cost of defending against the orders, including reasonable 
attorney's fees, and any damages or losses resulting from that order. 
7) If the court grants an interlocutory injunction forbidding 
dissemination, the defendant may demand and the court shall 
schedule a plenary hearing within twenty days. The court shall 
render judgment within ten days after the hearing. 
8) The court shall allow any person or organization with a 
pecuniary or artistic interest in the matter sought to be adjudicated 
to intervene as a defendant. The court may permit any other person 
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to appear as amicus curiae. 
9) Any defendant may demand that the obscenity issue be 
tried to a jury. 
10) The (prosecuting attorney) must prove obscenity by clear 
and convincing evidence. 
11) Pursuant to a jury verdict that the matter is not obscene, 
the court shall enter a judgment declaring the matter not obscene 
and dismissing the action. Pursuant to a jury verdict that the mat-
ter is obscene, the court shall independently determine whether the 
matter is obscene. 
12) In cases tried to juries and to the court, the court shall 
make findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
13) Pursuant to a jury verdict and a judicial finding or, in a 
case tried without a jury, a judicial finding that the matter is ob-
scene, the court shall declare. the matter to be obscene. The court 
may enjoin any or all defendants from disseminating the matter 
adjudicated to be obscene. 
14). Any party finally enjoined may appeal to the (appropriate 
appellate court). Any party adversely affected may appeal any final 
declaration or judgment to the (appropriate appellate court}. The 
(appellate court) shall independently consider whether to stay an 
injunction. The appeal shall be submitted and decided expedi-
tiously. 
15) If any party violates a restraining order or an injunction, 
the court may issue an order to show cause and upon hearing hold 
that party in contempt. The court may sentence any party found 
guilty of contempt to no more than a ($500) fine and (ninety days) 
imprisonment or impose any other lesser appropriate sanction. 
16) Any person or organization with a pecuniary or artistic 
interest in matter intended to be disseminated in the (county) may 
sue the (prosecuting attorney) and ask the court to declare matter 
not obscene and to enjoin prosecution. In this action, the (prosecut-
ing attorney) may counterclaim for a declaration of obscenity and 
seek remedies as herein provided. 
17) Declaratory judgment and injunction procedure which is 
inconsistent with this statute shall not govern actions brought under 
this statute. Except as herein provided, all actions brought under 
this statute shall be governed by the procedure which governs ordi-
nary civil actions. 
18) Actions under this statute shall be the exclusive method 
of controlling obscenity. All inconsistent statutes are repealed. 
The balance of this article will attempt to justify the provisions 
of this statute through an analysis of obscenity nuisance law. The 
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article will proceed in roughly chronological order, discussing stand-
ing, interlocutory orders, bonds, trials, right to a jury, final injunc-
tions, and post-injunction issues. 
IV. PROCEDURAL IssuEs BEFORE TRIAL 
A. Standing and Related Problems 
Under traditional equity doctrine public nuisance actions may 
be brought either by public officials or by private persons who can 
prove "special damages"; private persons who cannot show "special 
damages" are denied standing. 111 Occasionally, modern obscenity 
nuisance statutes broaden standing to include any resident of the 
county, 112 or "any corporation or association formed in this state for 
the suppression of vice." 113.The rationale for expanding standing in 
this manner is that "private attorneys general" will be more vigilant 
in suppressing vice than their professional counterparts. 
However, there are two basic reasons for retaining the public-
private distinction of traditional equity doctrine. First, as a general 
rule, legislatures, not courts, should resolve society's general prob-
lems. If courts are called upon to solve general problems, authorities 
accountable to the public should at least control the litigation 
mechanism. Second, private citizens adequately animated to be-
come obscenity nuisance plaintiffs may lack the perspective and 
discerning judgment on first amendment issues to be allowed to 
control obscenity litigation. Public officials may show more cir-
cumspection about bringing frivolous or unnecessary suits. 
For these reasons, the proposed statute allows suits only if 
brought by the prosecuting attorney in the name of the state. The 
statute requires that actions be brought by the prosecuting attorney 
rather than the state attorney general because prosecutorial discre-
tion should be exercised on a local level. It specifies the prosecuting 
attorney rather than "law enforcement officers"114 so that this dis-
cretion will be exercised by a legally trained official. 
Because the statute denies all standing to private litigants, no 
showing of special damages would be required under traditional 
111 Massachusetts Soc'y of Optometrists v. Waddick, 340 Mass. 58.1, 165 N.E.2d 394 
(1960). . 
112 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-30-10.5-3 (1975) (private plaintiff must post $1000 bond but 
if successful recovers reasonable attorney fees); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3767.03 (Page 1971); 
VA. CODE §§ 18.2-384(1), 385 (1975). See also Littleton v. Fritz, 65 Iowa 488, 22 N.W. 641 
(1885) (any person could sue to abate a liquor nuisance). 
113 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4712 (West 1968). 
'" N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-27.1-06 (1976). 
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equity doctrine. It is possible, however, that the special damage 
requirement provides protection for first amendment values over 
and above the protection afforded by restricting standing to public 
officials. This possibility is illustrated by two decisions of the Cali-
fornia courts. In Harmer v. Tonylyn Products, Inc. 115 private plain-
tiffs sued to enjoin the exhibition of a film as a public nuisance. The 
appellate court rejected the suit because only those who paid admis-
sion were exposed to the film, so the nuisance, if any, was not 
"public." The court stated that the mere philosophical discomfort 
of knowing that obscenity is afoot could not be analogized to an odor 
or something palpably impinging on the senses.116 
In effect, the Harmer court employed traditional standing doc-
trine of public nuisance law to extend the zone of privacy afforded 
to consumers of sexually explicit expression. In Stanley v. Georgia111 
the Supreme Court held that an individual cannot constitutionally 
be subject to a search for constitutionally suppressible obscenity in 
the privacy of his own home. Harmer's invocation of the special 
damages rule extended the protected zone to include self-selected 
commercial establishments. 
After Harmer, the Supreme Court concluded that the constitu-
tional right of privacy recognized in Stanley should not be extended 
to protect the commercial distribution or exhibition of obscene ma-
terials to consenting adults.118 This undoubtedly influenced the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court in rejecting one-half of Harmer in favor of 
the notion that what consenting adults see in a book store or movie 
theater may constitute a "public" nuisance. Over a vigorous dis-
sent, Busch v. Projection Room Theater119 ruled that "conduct of-
fensive to a community's moral sensibilities" is subject to civil re-
straint, even if that conduct takes place behind the closed doors of 
a commercial establishment. But since public officials brought the 
action in Busch, the court did not consider whether special damages 
had been shown.120 
Concern for privacy values and the difficulty of clearly defining 
suppressable obscenity have prompted Justice Brennan121 and Cali-
m 23 Cal. App. 3d 941, 100 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1972). 
111 Id. at 943, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 577. See also Napro Development Corp. v. Town of Berlin, 
376 A.2d 342, 345 (Vt. 1977). 
117 394 u.s. 557 (1969). 
"" Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
111 People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600, 130 Cal. 
Rptr. 328, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
128 Id. at 51, 550 P.2d at 605, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 333. 
121 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73-114, (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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fornia Supreme Court Justice Tobriner122 to advocate the Harmer 
result as a general rule of obscenity regulation. Consenting adults, 
they argue, should be allowed to consume any type of sexually ex-
plicit matter; state regulation should be limited to protecting un-
willing adults and children. The author personally accepts the 
Brennan-Tobriner view. Although state regulation of sexually ex-
plicit material is appropriate when public displays or the peculiar 
susceptibilities of children are involved, a business establishment 
that excludes minors, charges admission, and clearly informs people 
what is offered within, should be entitled to exhibit the annoying 
or even the outrageous. The proposed statute's alternative defini-
tion of "disseminate" is intended to allow a jurisdiction to adopt 
this alternative view. In functional terms, this definition imposes a 
rule of special damages, as defined by Harmer, even though obscen-
ity nuisances may be brought only by public officials. 
Under the alternative definition of "disseminate," courts would 
normally be required to enjoin either public displays of obscenity or 
sales to children. But additional problems may develop. Unlike or-
dinary movie theaters, drive-in theaters expose their screens to trav-
elers, neighbors, and groups of children. Although the Supreme 
Court in Erznoznik suggested that unwilling viewers of drive-in 
screens should merely "avert their eyes,"123 it is unrealistic to expect 
a parent driving an auto containing small children in heavy traffic 
to shield young eyes from the sight of a drive-in screen. Equity 
should-and can-be mo~e creative. Under the alternative defini-
tion of "disseminate," judges should call upon the remedial flexibil-
ity of equity and focus on the whole environment, abating unwar-
ranted dissemination with fencing requirements or changes in 
screen location. 
Furthermore, obscene books and pictures, unlike exhibition of 
moving pictures, present the possibility of an outside resale business 
to minors. 124 The proposed statute's alternative definition antici-
pates that resale is one of the types of dissemination that a court 
may enjoin. But the authorities must proceed against the bootlegger 
who resells rather than the merchant who sells legitimately to 
adults. This is essentially the approach now adopted toward liquor 
regulation. As is true with all "victimless" infractions, the authori-
122 Bloom v. Municipal Court, 16 Cal. 3d 71, 86-100, 545 P.2d 229, 239-48, 127 Cal. Rptr. 
317, 327-36 (1976) (Tobriner, J., dissenting). 
123 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). 
12
' Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 n.7 (1973). See also State ex rei. Field 
v. Hess, 540 P.2d 1165, 1170 (Okla. "1975). 
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ties may find it difficult to suppress clandestine commerce in ob-
scene materials to minors. This is a common problem of sumptuary 
regulation, however, rather than a peculiarity of civil obscenity. 
The state's proper interest in regulating obscenity is to stop 
distribution for commercial gain without interfering with constitu-
tionally protected privacy. Thus, the proposed statute's first defini-
tion of "disseminate" is intended to reach any commercial exploita-
tion of obscene materials. "Disseminate" includes both printed 
material and motion pictures; "exhibit" includes other forms of 
commercial exploitation such as broadcasting or performing. Juris-
dictions that wish to reach noncommercial purveyors may do so by 
also enacting the first half of the alternative definition of 
"disseminate." This extension, however, runs into the danger of 
impermissibly interfering with constitutionally protected privacy.125 
A court confronted with an jmpermissible application of the ex-
tended definition should limit the statute by finding that a noncom-
mercial exhibition in the home does not constitute a "public" nuis-
ance. 
B. Interlocutory Restraints 
Generally, an interlocutory restraint is an order directing a 
party to stop something or retain something pending the court's 
decision on the merits. Interlocutory restraints serve two functions: 
they preserve a controversy for later adjudication, and they ensure 
that the court will be able to give full relief to the moving party. In 
the sensitive area of free speech, however, interlocutory restraints 
pose considerable danger. Orders that purport only to preserve the 
status quo may deter or inhibit the defendant from further distribu-
tion, and thus may be final in practice.126 Moreover, the commercial 
and communicative value of expression-related materials is often 
short-lived, making later reversal of an interlocutory order merely 
symbolic if the occasion for the expression is gone forever. 127 The 
first question to resolve, then, is the extent to which interlocutory 
restraints are compatible with the first amendment. 
1. Ex Parte Orders and the Problem of Prior Restraints. 
Whether a court may issue an interlocutory order restraining 
125 Airways Theatre, Inc. v. Canale, 366 F. Supp. 343, 346 (W.D. Tenn. 1973); Grove 
Press, Inc. v. Flask, 326 F. Supp. 574, 579 (N.D. Ohio 1970). 
1
" United Farm Workers v. Superior Ct., 14 Cal. 3d 902, 913, 537 P.2d 1237, 1244, 122 
Cal. Rptr. 877, 894 (1975). 
m See, e.g., Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (reversing a 
three-year-old temporary injunction); Carroll v. President & Comm'rs, 393 U.S. 175 (1968) 
(reversing a two-year-old ten-day restraining order). 
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expression-related activity is generally approached under the doc-
trine of prior restraints. Unfortunately, definitional confusion 
abounds in this area. 128 Generally speaking, a prior restraint is the 
imposition of legal sanctions for the distribution of expression-
related material before a final adjudication of whether this distribu-
tion can be so restrained. 129 As applied to court orders and decrees, 
prior restraints can occur in one of two ways: through the failure to 
provide the necessary procedures before sanctions for distribution 
are imposed, or through the rendering of an order or decree that goes 
beyond the scope of the materials adjudicated. I shall call the for-
mer a procedural prior restraint, and the latter a remedial prior 
restraint. The distinction can be illustrated by a simple example. 
If a judge enjoins the December issue of the Law Review as obscene 
without affording notice or a hearing to the editors, this is a proce-
dural prior restraint. But if a judge, after notice and a full hearing, 
determines that the December issue of the Law Review is obscene, 
and enjoins publication of both the December and January issues, 
this is a remedial prior restraint. Remedial prior restraints will be 
considered later; this section is concerned with procedural prior 
restraints. 
The most radical of interlocutory restraints are ex parte re-
straints, since the defendant is not eyen provided with notice before 
the restraint issues. But, as a brief review of the Supreme Court's 
major decisions on procedural prior restraints indicates, even the 
basic question of the constitutionality of ex parte restraining orders 
has not been definitively resolved. 
Kingsl-ey Books, Inc. v. Brown130 has been read as approving of 
ex parte injunctions as part of a statutory scheme for the regulation 
of pornography. 131 The Supreme Court upheld a New York statute 
that allowed municipalities to obtain civil injunctions against ob-
scene material and to obtain orders for the seizure of such material. 
Under the statute, an ex parte injunction could be obtained, but the 
defendant was entitled to a trial on the issue of obscenity within one 
day, and to a decision within two days of the conclusion of the 
1211 T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 503-12 (1970). 
"' ld. at 504. See Paper Back Mart v. City of Anniston, 407 F. Supp. 376, 378-79 (N.D. 
Ala. 1976); Edelstein & Mott, supra note 38, at 547; cf. Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 
29 STAN. L. REv. 539, 542-43 (1977) ("The doctrine of prior restraint nullifies a particular prior 
restraint without deciding whether the same speech could constitutionally be restricted by 
'subsequent punishment.'" [citation omitted]). 
130 345 u.s. 436 (1957). 
131 See Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARv. L. REv. 518, 533-34 n.61 
(1970). 
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trial.132 Thus the ex parte restraint was of very limited duration, and 
was not the principal focus of the Court's decision. 
Freedman v. Maryland, 133 probably the leading case on proce-
dural prior restraints, endorsed the Kingsley procedure, stating that 
it "postpones any restraint against sale until a judicial determina-
tion of obscenity following notice and an adversary hearing."134 On 
this reading, Kingsley did not involve an ex parte interlocutory 
restraint at all. In the obscenity nuisance procedure authorized by 
Paris Adult Theatre I, 135 an adversary hearing preceded the injunc-
tion and so the issue did not arise. 
An examination of the logic of Supreme Court decisions outside 
the context of ex parte restraints against obscenity strongly suggests 
that such restraints are unconstitutional. Particularly important in 
this regard are Freedman v. Maryland, 138 Carroll v. President & 
Commissioners of Princess A~ne, 137 and Fuentes v. Shevin. 138 
Freedman ruled that a system of administrative licensing of 
motion pictures is constitutional only if conducted pursuant to 
"procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censor-
ship system."139 The Court determined that a constitutional admin-
istrative licensing scheme must (1) assure a prompt judicial deter-
mination of obscenity; (2) place the burden of instituting judicial 
proceedings on the administrator; and (3) limit the duration of any 
restraint imposed prior to judicial review to that required briefly to 
preserve the status quo. 14° Freedman suggests the possibility of im-
posing a restraining order before judicial review but after an adver-
sary administrative procedure. But it does not in any way support 
dispensing with notice altogether. 
Carroll v. President & Commissioners of Princess Anne141 con-
cerned an ex parte restraint outside the obscenity context. The 
Maryland Court of Appeals had upheld an ex parte injunction 
132 354 U.S. at 437-38 n.l. The trial court appeared to assume a hearing before any 
injunction. Burke v. Kingsley Books, Inc., 208 Misc. 150, 164, 142 N.Y.S.2d 735, 747 (Sup. 
Ct. 1955). . 
ll3 380 u.s. 51 (1965). 
1
'" !d. at 60. See also Stengel v. Smith, 18 App. Div. 2d 458, 459, 240 N.Y.S.2d 200, 201-
02 (1963); Tenney v. Liberty News Distribs., Inc., 13 App. Div. 2d 770, 215 N.Y.S.2d 663 
(1961). 
llS 413 u.s. 49, 55 (1973). 
131 380 u.s. 51 (1965). 
131 393 u.s. 175 (1968). 
131 407 u.s. 67 (1972). 
13
' 380 U.S. at 58. 
1
" !d. at 58-59. 
lU 393 u.s. 175 (1968). 
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against a racist rally on the ground that the rally presented a clear 
and present danger of violence. Although the Supreme Court re-
fused to disapprove of all ex parte orders, it declared this one un-
constitutional. The Court stressed three reasons why ex parte 
procedures were inappropriate: the injunction forbade expressive 
conduct; the order raised issues that required the trial court to re-
solve difficult factual and legal problems; and the defendants were 
available for notice. These reasons apply with equal force to civil 
injunctions of obscenity. 
Lower courts have distinguished Carroll as involving political 
speech, and have refused to apply it in the context of obscenity 
injunctions, where the timeliness of expression is considered less 
important. 142 But these courts often forget that a merchant has a 
constitutional right to sell, and the public a first amendment right 
to receive, 143 protected expression-even if it is sexually explicit. 
And timing and momentum may be as important to the distributor 
of sexually explicit expression as to the political publicist. Public 
demand is often ephemeral, and even a short delay produced by an 
interlocutory order can damage a business. Moreover, providing 
notice is not particularly onerous in the obscenity nuisance context. 
Most businesses have a telephone or a street address and can be 
notified formally or informally without difficulty.144 
The third source of relevant precedent lies outside the first 
amendment context altogether. Fuentes v. Shevin145 struck down as 
inconsistent with due process a statute that allowed a plaintiff to 
replevy personal property in the possession of another without no-
tice. The Court ruled that the state ordinarily cannot disturb a 
constitutionally cognizable interest in property without providing 
notice and an opportunity to be heard. Fuentes permits the state to 
affect a protected property interest without notice only in an 
"extraordinary situation."146 Three prerequisites exist: 
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to 
secure an important governmental or general public interest. 
112 ABC Books, Inc. v. Benson, 315 F. Supp. 695, 700 (M.D. Tenn. 1970); Gov. Peterson, 
14 Ariz. App. 12, 14, 480 P.2d 35, 37 (1971). But cf. United Farm Workers v. Superior Ct., 14 
Cal. 3d 902, 537 P.2d 1237, 122 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1975) (groundbreaking opinion uses Carroll 
reasoning in picketing case). 
113 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 756 (1976); Stanley v. Georgia 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). 
'" FED. R. C1v. P. 65(b); Advisory Committee's Note to 1966 Amendments to Rule 65(b), 
39 F.R.D. 124-25 (1966); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2952 
(1973) . 
... 407 u.s. 67 (1972). 
'" Id. at 90. 
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Second, there has been a special need for very prompt action. 
Third, the state has kept strict control over its monopoly of 
legitimate force; the person initiating the seizure has been a 
government official responsible for determining, under the 
standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary 
and justified in the particular instance.147 
The Court gave examples in which these criteria could be said to 
have been met: tax collection, the war effort, bank failures, mis-
branded drugs, and contaminated foods. 148 
Of course, some perceive obscenity regulation as the last bas-
tion shielding civilization from barbarism. They would analogize 
the moral pestilence of obscenity to contaminated foods, and find a 
compelling public interest that mandates an immediate ex parte 
response. More realistically, however, lower courts that take 
Fuentes's examples seriously should sanction ex parte restraints 
against obscenity rarely if at all. Fuentes's third standard, requiring 
state control of ex parte procedure, a statutory definition of the 
emergency, and an emergency in fact, is also to the point. At a 
minimum it precludes a private obscenity nuisance plaintiff from 
securing an ex parte order. It reinforces the emphasis of Miller v. 
California149 on precise standards, and the concern of Carroll for a 
searching factual inquiry whenever possible. 
The logic of Freedman, Carroll, and Fuentes argues strongly for 
requiring notice before an interlocutory restraint may issue.150 Simi-
"' Id. at 91. 
'" Id. at 91-92. In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), the Court distin-
guished Fuentes and allowed an installment seller to repossess property after an ex parte 
judicial hearing and posting of sufficient bond. Mitchell apparently turned on the duality of 
ownership-both seller and buyer had property interests in the property in question and the 
statute involved provided a reasonable balancing of such interests. See Rendleman, 
Analyzing the Debtor's Due Process Interest, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 35 (1975). 
"' 413 u.s. 15 (1973). 
,,. Grove Press, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 418 F.2d 82, 89 (3d Cir. 1969); Llewelyn v. 
Oakland County Prosecutor's Office, 402 F. Supp. 1379, 1382-83 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Meyer 
v. Austin, 319 F. Supp. 457, 463 (M.D. Fla. 1970); Newman v. Conover, 313 F.·Supp. 623, 
631 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600, 130 
Cal. Rptr. 328, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Camil v. Buena Vista Cinema, 129 Cal. Rptr. 
315, 318 (Ct. App. 1976); State v. "The Bet," 219 Kan. 64, 547 P.2d 760, 769 (1976); Gulf 
States Theaters, Inc. v. Richardson, 287 So. 2d 480, 489 (La. 1974); Commonwealth v. Guild 
Theatre, Inc., 432 Pa. 378, 382, 248 A.2d 45, 48 (1968). See also Skinner v. Superior Court, 
69 Cal. App. 3d 183, 137 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1977). 
Several criminal obscenity decisions dealing with the procedural standards for the issu-
ance of search warrants are also relevant. At one time it appeared that the Constitution 
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larly, Freedman and Carroll advance persuasive first amendment 
reasons for requiring an adversary proceeding before a court may 
impose an interlocutory restraint. Because it is difficult to separate 
protected expression from obscenity, adversary procedures help as-
sure that the critical issues will be illuminated for the court. Cer-
tainly a court should hear both sides before embarking on the inevit-
ably difficult task of finding the facts, applying the law, and draft-
ing an acceptable order. An order to stop selling a book or exhibiting 
a movie is final with respect to the sales and exhibitions pre-
vented.151 Given the public's interest in communication and the 
court's interest in precise tools for distinguishing obscenity from 
protected communication, adversary procedures prior to the issu-
ance of an injunction do not entail difficulties too burdensome to 
tolerate. 
In short, the Constitution compels notice and an opportunity 
to be heard before interrupting any phase of the right to sell or 
receive expression-related material. Notice may be as informal as a 
telephone call. And the adversary procedure that may lead to an 
interlocutory injunction does not have to be a plenary trial. 152 It may 
consist of no more than the opportunity to appear and present oral 
argument in opposition to interlocutory relief. Beyond these require-
ments, however, further protection from interim equitable relief 
should not be required. Courts quite properly hold parties who vio-
late interlocutory injunctions in contempt. The Vermont obscenity 
nuisance statute forbids the imposition of punitive measures unless 
the merchant violates a "final injunction."153 This, however, pro-
tects merchants more than due process requires. 
required an adversary hearing before a warrant could issue for the seizure of obscene material. 
A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964) (plurality opinion per Brennan, 
J.). See Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkerson, 410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1969). In Heller v. New York, 413 
U.S. 483 (1973), however, the Court permitted the authorities to seize a movie print without 
an adversary hearing. The facts of Heller are somewhat unique-the magistrate issuing the 
warrant had personally viewed the offending picture before approving the seizure, and there 
was no showing that the seizure of a single copy of the film precluded its continued exhibition 
pending trial. Id. at 490, 492. The Court distinguished cases involving injunctions of exhibit-
ing a film or destruction of the print. !d. at 490. And in a companion case, the Court expressly 
overturned a warrant that issue'd after an officer had seized the suspect picture. Roaden v. 
Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973). 
151 Cf. Heller v. New York, ·413 U.S. 483, 490 (1973) ("In this case, of course, the film 
was not subjected to any form of 'final restraint,' in the sense of being enjoined from exhibi-
tion .... ");Rendleman, Toward Due Process in Injunction Procedure, 1973 U.ILL. L.F. 221, 
242-43. 
152 FED. R. Ctv. P. 65(a); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRoCEDURE§ 
2949 (1973). 
153 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2809 (Supp. 1977). 
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The proposed statute departs from traditional injunction proce-
dure to comport with the procedural safeguards required by the first 
amendment. As the Court noted in Freedman, "[o]nly a judicial 
determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary 
sensitivity to freedom of expression."154 To enjoin dissemination, the 
proposed statute requires formal or informal notice to the defen-
dant, and a hearing not sooner than twenty-four hours after the 
defendant receives notice. The twenty-four hour waiting period rep-
resents a compromise. A hearing immediately after notice might 
attenuate the defendant's preparation and destroy his opportunity 
to be meaningfully heard. Yet if the state has correctly filed the 
action, two days is a long time to stand idly by muttering impreca-
tions while the defendant exhausts an inventory or fills a theatre 
several times. While some may think one day is twenty-four hours 
too much notice, the author considers it a necessary procedural 
safeguard "designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship sys-
tem."l55 
The statute permits general equity procedure to prescribe the 
"nature and form" of interlocutory hearings. One caveat is in order: 
"Since the essential reason for the requirement of a prior hearing is 
to prevent unfair and mistaken deprivations ... , it is axiomatic 
that the hearing must provide a real test." 156 Finally, Kingsley 
Books and Freedman suggest two provisions that hasten final deci-
sions: a defendant who cannot disseminate because of a preliminary 
order may demand a prompt hearing and decision on the merits; 
and appeals "shall be submitted and decided expeditiously." These 
provisions "assure a prompt final judicial decision, to minimize the 
deterrent effect of an interim and perhaps erroneous"157 decision, 
while recognizing the need for procedures compatible with sound 
and considered decisionmaking. 
2. Preservation Orders. Interlocutory restraints may be im-
posed without adversary procedures when they do not interfere with 
a constitutionally cognizable interest. 15~ The preservation order in 
United States v. Little Beaver Theatre159 is an example of this. The 
court, without notice, enjoined the theater from "disposing of, relin-
quishing possession of, or in any manner cutting, altering, splicing, 
151 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). 
155 Id. 
151 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972). 
157 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965). 
1 
.. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
151 324 F. Supp. 120 (S.D. Fla. 1971). 
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destroying or mutilating subject motion picture Turned on Girl for 
a period of ten days .... " 160 The authorities apparently resorted 
to ex parte procedure because they feared that the film might be 
transported or altered, 161 yet they believed they could not seize it 
under a search warrant without an adversary proceeding. 162 
The Little Beaver injunction accommodates several interests: 
the state receives an order backed by the court's contempt power 
which preserves the evidence; the defendant is permitted to con-
tinue his business; and the court is able to adjudicate the obscenity 
of a film that might otherwise end up in Mexico or the projection-
ist's wastebasket. Ex parte preservation orders are constitutional, 
for they neither restrain expression prior to publication nor deter 
future expression.163 
Obscenity nuisance statutes generally provide for preservation 
orders. 164 Absent a statute, courts probably have discretion to issue 
such orders under ordinary equity doctrine, despite the minor incon-
gruity that a Little Beaver order compels the defendant to preserve 
the nuisance. Courts may also grant preservation orders ancillary to 
a criminal case. In fact, both the state and the merchant may prefer 
a preservation order to ex parte criminal seizure, since such an order 
accomplishes everything ex parte seizure does without criminal 
stigma.165 Under a system of dual remedies, however, a defendant 
may fear that the authorities are using equity to obtain discovery 
for subsequent criminal proceedings. 166 This fear is legitimate, but 
again it derives from the availability to the state of multiple reme-
dies, not from the nature of a preservation order. 
3. Erroneous Interlocutory Orders. Statutes and rules com-
monly require a plaintiff who receives an interlocutory remedy to 
post bond, 167 which the defendant may recover upon if the order is 
later determined to have been wrongly granted. Short of malicious 
prosecution, the bond normally limits the plaintiff's liability for an 
"" ld. at 120. 
111 Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 493 (1973); Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, 
416 F.2d 410, 412 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970). 
"
2 Meyer v. Austin, 319 F. Supp. 457, 464 (M.D. Fla. 1970). But see Heller v. New York, 
413 u.s. 483 (1973). 
103 See Gov. Peterson, 14 Ariz. App. 12, 13-14, 480 P.2d 35, 36-37 (1971). 
'" See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-30-10.5-4 (1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.2(d)(3) (Supp. 
1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3019 (1975). 
, .. See Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1973). 
"' Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 463-65 (1975); Classic Distribs., Inc. v. Zimmerman, 
387 F. Supp. 829, 833 n.6 (M.D. Pa. 1974). 
117 See generally Dobbs, ShoulrJ Security Be Required as a Pre-Condition to Provisional 
Injunctive Relief?, 52 N.C.L. REV. 1091 (1974). 
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inappropriate interlocutory restraint.t6s Unless the plaintiff truly 
needs an interlocutory order and is confident of the ultimate out-
come, the cost of the bond and the chance of liability upon it may 
deter him from seeking provisional relief. 
Someone must bear the expense of an improvidently granted 
interlocutory injunction. For a movie theater the expense might 
include the cost of renting the enjoined print, lost profits from lower 
ticket sales, and unrecoverable expenses related to advertising, 
building rental, wages and salaries, and so forth. 
As a general rule, the applicant for extraordinary relief should 
protect the defendant against the risk of an incorrect interim order. 
Interlocutory orders are frequently not appealable. Even if appeala-
ble, the reviewing court generally accords very deferential oversight 
to preliminary injunctions, reviewing for abuse of discretion, not 
correctness.169 Moreover, appellate review is time consuming and 
does not compensate for the past effects of an erroneous decision. 
Despite these considerations, rules and statutes generally ex-
clude governmental plaintiffs from posting bonds when requesting 
interlocutory relief, 170 and obscenity nuisance statutes are no excep-
tion.171 General principles of sovereign immunity protect both the 
judge172 and prosecuting attorney173 from liability for damages in all 
but the most exacerbated instances.174 Under these circumstances 
the expense of an erroneous interim decision falls on the merchant. 
Obscenity nuisances thus present a compelling case for some 
kind of governmental liability to deter hasty requests for interim 
relief and to compensate for improper interlocutory restraints. Pro-
fessor Dobbs suggests that legislatures modify general security stat-
utes by making governmental units liable for improperly granted 
interlocutory restraints, but without making them post a security or 
bond. 175 The proposed civil obscenity statute incorporates this 
suggestion. Power without restraint is unacceptable, particularly 
"" ld. at 1122-23. . 
'" See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Graver, 461 Pa. 131, 134, 334 A.2d 667, 669 (1975); Moore 
v. State, 470 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). 
"" See, e.g., FED. R. Ctv. P. 65(c). 
m FLA. STAT. § 847.013(3)(d) (1976); N.Y. Ctv. PRAc. LAw§ 6330(4) (McKinney Supp. 
1976) (also exonerating plaintiff from malicious prosecution). In Indiana, a private plaintiff 
must post a $1000 bond but, if successful, recovers attorney's fees. IND. CODE § 35-30-10.5-3 
(1975). But see City of Aurora v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 16 lll. App. 2d 273, 
276, 147 N.E.2d 694, 695 (1958) (requiring $4000 bond). 
172 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). 
172 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
m Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871). 
175 Dobbs, supra note 167, at 1165. 
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given the political and cultural realities of obscenity litigation and 
the fragile nature of expression. Governmental immunity creates 
irresponsibility; 176 legislatures would do well to consider this pro-
posal carefully. 
V. PROCEDURAL ISSUES AT TRIAL 
Obscenity nuisances raise three procedural issues concerning 
the conduct of the trial itseif. First, should the court summon a jury 
to decide the obscenity question? Second, what should be the stan-
dard of proof? And third, if the state proves that the material is 
obscene, should the judge be compelled to enjoin further distribu-
tion, or should the nature of the relief be left to the judge's 
discretion? 
A. Right to Trial by Jury 
The choice of criminal or equitable remedies is inextricably 
linked to the issue of the right to jury trial. In a court of equity, the 
judge finds the facts, applies the law, and formulates the relief. 177 
The judge may summon a jury to render an advisory verdict, 178 but 
the defendant stands before the court without a right to jury trial, 
whether the issue is the existence of a nuisance or the commission 
of contempt. 179 
The first line of defense of those who object to employing equity 
to deprive the defendant of the safeguards associated with criminal 
prosecution is the venerable maxim that "equity will not enjoin a 
crime." Courts generally avoid the maxim with circumlocutions 
such as "the mere fact that the act constituting a nuisance is also 
a crime does not hinder the use of the civil processes to procure its 
abatement where the use of pi·operty is a part."180 But the maxim 
expresses a wise policy about a defendant's procedural rights, par-
178 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 25.01 (1972). 
171 Kane, Civil Jury Trial: The Case For Reasoned Iconoclasm, 28 HAST. L. J. 1, 5 (1966). 
178 FEn. R. Civ. P. 39(c); 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE§ 
2335 (1971). 
170 Eilenbecker v. District Cf., 134 U.S. 31 (1890); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
Unless punishment for contempt exceeds six months. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 
(1974); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974). 
180 Goose v. Commonwealth ex rel. Dummit, 305 Ky. 644, 646, 205 S.W.2d 326, 328 
(1947). See also Toushin v. City of Chicago, 23 lll. App. 3d 797, 803-04, 320 N.E.2d 202, 207 
(1974). The property requirement is, in fact, of little importance in statutory nuisances which 
focus on conduct. See IowA ConE § 123.70 (Supp. 1977) (defining an ambulatory liquor 
nuisance: "[T]he fact that an offender has no known or permanent place of business . . . 
shall not prevent • . . [an] injuncti~n . • . from issuing.") 
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ticularly the right to jury trial. 181 As recently as 1973, an Illinois 
court refused to enjoin an "obscene" bookstore because "equity will 
not enjoin a crime."1S2 
Nonetheless, the civil obscenity defendant should not be en-
titled to a jury trial simply because the criminal obscenity defen-
dant is. The civil action lowers the stakes. The defendant loses the 
right to a jury trial and to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but the 
state must be satisfied with a milder remedy. The court may cir-
cumscribe the defendant commercially, but not personally. To 
argue against the civil action because it lacks a jury trial is to argue 
that the legislature must be as solicitous of the defendant's proce-
dural options when seeking a mild remedy as a harsh one. 
Merchants probably have more to gain than prosecutors from 
broad-based community participation in obscenity adjudication. 
Jurors are drawn from across social classes, ages, races, and sexes. 
In contrast, judges are predominantly selected from upper-middle 
class white male lawyers. Where, as in obscenity regulation, the 
issues are generational and cultural, the unanimity rule generally 
followed in jury trials makes an adverse judgment less likely from a 
jury than from a judge.183 Thus, some who argue against an equita-
ble remedy are actually arguing for jury trial of obscenity, since they 
think a jury will find for the merchant in close cases. Justice Tobri-
ner put it this way: 
The fact that the public nuisance statutes relegate the decision 
to a judge, rather than to a jury, exacerbates the chilling effect. 
A dealer in protected material who might have been confident 
that no group of 12 jurors would unanimously conclude that his 
material offended community standards might find himself 
inhibited by the greater uncertainty of how a single member of 
the community-the judge-would react to it.184 
Moreover, some may argue that a jury should be allowed, or even 
encouraged, to nullify unpopular substantive law. 185 
"
1 See Southland Theaters v. State ex rel. Tucker, 254 Ark. 192, 492 S.W.2d 421 (1973). 
102 People v. Goldman, 7 lll. App. 3d 253, 254, 287 N.E.2d 177, 178 (1972) (alternative 
holding). But see City of Aurora v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 16 TIL App. 2d 273, 
147 N.E.2d 694 (1958). 
1
" See, e.g., Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 404 F. Supp. 33, 37 (S.D. Tex. 1975) 
(two hung juries), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Butler v. Dexter, 425 U.S. 262 
(1976). But see Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARv. L. REv. 518, 527 (1970) 
(jury insensitive to first amendment interests). 
1
"' People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 546 P .2d 733, 752 n.6, 128 Cal. Rptr. 
229, 248 n.6 (Tobriner, J., dissenting), vacated, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600, 130 Cal. Rptr. 
328, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
105 Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say NO, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 168 (1972). 
544 The University of Chicago Law Review [44:509 
Different considerations animate prosecutors. Prosecutions are 
protracted and expensive. If juries are often hung, or if they acquit, 
then the authorities may be induced to cease to "beat a dead 
horse."186 Prosecutors may prefer judge-tried civil nuisance actions 
over criminal prosecution for this very reason.187 In a democracy, 
however, public dislike of substantive law is a poor reason to allow 
equitable relief. 188 
A constitutional argument for a right to jury trial in civil ob-
scenity proceedings made in a challenge to Virginia's in rem obscen-
ity statute was summarily rejected by the Supreme Court. 189 In a 
brief per curiam opinion, the Court held "a trial by jury is not 
constitutionally required in this state civil proceeding."190 .A note-
writer has suggested that the Supreme Court's approval of nonjury 
in rem procedure might not extend to in personam injunctions 
where the control of conduct is involved}91 However, the traditional 
wisdom is that a defendant's claim of a constitutional right to a jury 
trial is at its weakest when a plaintiff seeks an in personam rem-
edy .192 Thus, when the Court rejected a right to trial by jury for in 
rem obscenity, it foreclosed a jury for in personam injunctions. 
The most persuasive argument for a jury is based on the nature 
of the substantive obscenity standard set forth by Miller v. 
California. 193 This argument began even before Miller with Justice 
Brennan's dissent in Kingsley Books. 194 Under substantive obscenity 
law, the community sets the standard, and a jury represents a cross 
section of the community. Therefore, Justice Brennan argued, a jury 
is "the necessary safeguard demanded by the freedoms of speech 
and press for material which is not obscene."195 In Miller, the Su-
preme Court, rejecting a national obscenity standard, enhanced its 
emphasis on the community and the local jury as the arbiter of 
131 Washington Post, Oct. 22, 1973, § C, at 1. 
182 Black, The Expansion of Criminal Equity Under Prohibition, 5 Wise. L. REv. 412, 417 
(1930). 
183 But see Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Pollitt, 258 Ky. 489, 80 S.W.2d 
543 (1935) (equitable action held proper after grand jury refused to return indictment). 
181 Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 836 (1973), on remand, 214 Va. 539, 203 S.E.2d 441 
(1974). The Court also approved the Maryland censorship and licensing process which oper-
ates without a jury. Star v. Preller, 419 U.S. 956, aff'g 375 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Md. 1974). See 
also Dist. Att'y v. Three Way Theaters Corp., 357 N.E.2d 747 (Mass. 1976). 
110 413 U.S. at 836. 
111 Note, Defects in Indiana's Pornographic Nuisance Act, 491No. L.J. 320, 327-28 (1974). 
112 D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.6, at 74 (1973). 
113 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973). See note 5 supra. 
111 354 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1957) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
115 Id. at 448. 
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community values. 196 Hamling v. United States191 further stressed 
the jury's role in discerning and applying community standards. 
Justice Brennan renewed his argument for jury trial of obscenity in 
civil cases in McKinney v. Alabama, 198 but to no avail. Justice To-
briner has also recently contended that because of the definition of 
obscenity, "[t]he jury, as a microcosm of the community, is the 
only vehicle fit to conduct that inquiry."199 
The Missouri Supreme Court grasped the essentials of the 
Brennan-Tobriner argument in McNary v. Carlton. 200 The court 
found that the diverse attitudes and desires of different communi-
ties in Missouri demand that neither residents of St. Louis County 
nor residents of Dade County set standards for the other. Although 
the court recognized that equity usually proceeds without a jury, it 
compelled trial courts to try obscenity injunctions to "advisory" 
juries. 201 And the court ruled that the trial court would be bound by 
a jury verdict that the material involved was not obscene.202 
Even though the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution 
does not. require a jury trial in a civil obscenity proceeding, the 
explicit teaching of Miller and Hamling is that a jury is a useful 
gauge.203 It is possible that the Court will reexamine the jury ques-
tion, reject the nature of the remedy as the key, and require a jury 
trial in both the criminal and civil obscenity context.204 Better yet, 
as Justice Brennan suggests, either the legislature or state appellate 
courts may extend the right to jury trial to civil obscenity.205 
'" 413 U.S. at 30-34. 
117 418 U.S. 87, 103-08 (1974). In the companion case, Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 
160 (1974), the Court overturned a jury verdict of obscenity, stating that juries do not have 
"unbridled discretion in determining what is 'patently offensive.' " 
"" 424 U.S. 669, 687-89 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
'" People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 546 P.2d 733, 745-46 n.1, 128 Cal. 
Rptr. 229, 241-42 n.1 (Tobriner, J., dissenting), vacated, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600, 130 Cal. 
Rptr. 328, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Cf. Vergil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1130 n.13 
(9th Cir. 1975) (right to privacy) ("We believe that a determination founded on community 
mores must be largely resolved by a jury subject to close judicial scrutiny to ensure that the 
jury resolutions comport with First Amendment principles."). 
200 527 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1975). 
201 Id. at 347-48. 
20% ld. at 348. Both trial and appellate courts must independently determine obscenity. 
203 See, e.g., State ex rel. Cahalan v. Diversified Theatrical Corp., 396 Mich. 244, 245 n.3, 
240 N.W.2d 460, 461 n.3 (1975) (advisory jury); Richards v. State, 497 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1973). 
"'' See DeSalvo v. Codd, 386 F. Supp. 1293, 1303 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Oakes, J., dissent-
ing). 
205 McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 688-89 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). Appar-
ently there is no right to a non-jury trial. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 
510 (1959); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRocEDURE§ 2317, at 84 (1970); 
Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1176 (1961). 
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The proposed statute follows Brennan's advice and extends 
jury trial to civil obscenity. It requires the judge following ordinary 
civil procedure to determine whether the plaintiff's evidence gener-
ates a jury question. A jury's exonerating verdict terminates the 
proceeding. If the jury finds the matter obscene, the statute compels 
the judge independently to determine whether the material is ob-
scene. This is patterned after the Missouri court's decision in 
McNary v. Carlton, 206 and ·is intended to ensure "the necessary sen-
sitivity to freedom of expression."207 In addition, the statute lays a 
foundation for appellate review by asking the trial judge to draft 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
B. Standards of Proof 
Normally, the civil plaintiff must persuade the factfinder by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 208 The proposed statute departs from 
this and requires "clear and convincing evidence." Traditionally an 
equitable standard, but also a standard a jury can apply, 209 "clear 
and convincing" asks the factfinder to determine whether the pro-
ponent's contention is "highly probable." In a civil proceeding that 
neither threatens the defendant's liberty, nor imposes a criminal 
stigma, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is too imposing a standard 
to administer.210 Yet as Justice Brennan has observed, "[i]n light 
of the command of the First Amendment, a standard of proof by a 
mere preponderance of the evidence poses too substantial a danger 
that protected material will be erroneously suppressed."211 I sought 
and found a compromise: clear and convincing evidence. 
Civil obscenity trials otherwise present few problems of proof. 
Blunderbuss anachronisms from the liquor nuisance era like allow-
ing "general reputation" evidence to show a prima facie nuisance 
must be rejected. The use of reputation evidence would undermine 
both the substantive constitutional standard attuned to the nature 
of the materials, and Freedman's requirement of a judicial determi-
20
' 527 S.W.2d 343 (1975). 
207 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). 
208 C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE§ 339 (2d ed. 1972). 
209
• Id. § 340; Van Heeke, Trial By Jury in Equity Cases, 31 N.C.L. REv. 157, 169 (1953). 
210 But see McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 690 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(beyond a reasonable doubt in civil cases). 
211 Id. at 685. 
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nation.212 For defendants with poor reputations it would also reverse 
the burden of proof. 213 
C. The Chancellor's Discretion to Enjoin 
After the jury's verdict and the judge's independent finding of 
obscenity, the proposed civil obscenity statute returns to its equita-
ble origins. The judge determines the nature of the plaintiff's rem-
edy. Normally a chancellor possesses broad discretion to shape an 
equitable remedy, 214 but some obscenity nuisance laws purport to 
force the remedial hand. In Indiana, if the plaintiff sustains the 
allegations in the petition, the act compels the judge to issue a 
temporary injunction. 215 Under the Ohio statute, if the judge finds 
that a theater is showing an obscene film, the relief is mandatory: 
the judge must enjoin the nuisance perpetually, impose a $300 tax, 
order personal property removed and sold, and abate the nuisance 
by closing the theater for one year.216 The Ohio Supreme Court held 
that the word "shall" creates a mandatory duty to impose the reme-
dies provided, but moderated the statute's impact by insisting that 
the judge find scienter before imposing the tax and limiting the 
nuisance to a particular obscene film.217 
Louisiana's statute went even further. It compelled the judge 
to grant a temporary injunction when the district attorney alleged, 
with a verified affidavit on information and belief, that an obscenity 
nuisance existed. 218 This not only supplanted judicial discretion but 
also omitted the usually rigorous standard for interlocutory relief. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court struck it down. Holding that "shall" 
meant mandatory interlocutory relief, the court declared the statute 
invalid because the state could suppress alleged obscenity without 
a hearing and a prior judicial determination.219 
212 Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 404 F. Supp. 33, 46 (S.D. Tex. 1975), remanded 
on other grounds sub nom. Butler v. Dexter, 425 U.S. 262 (1976). 
213 Nihiser v. Sendak, 405 F. Supp. 482, 495 (N.D. Ind. 1974), vacated and remanded, 
423 u.s. 976 (1976). 
211 0. F1ss, INJUNCTIONS 91-93 (1972). 
21• IND. CoDE § 35-30-10.5-4 (1973). 
211 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3767.01-.09 (Page 1971). 
217 State ex rel. Ewing v. "Without a Stitch," 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 103, 104-05, 307 N.E.2d 
911, 917-18 (1974), appeal dismissed sub nom. Art Theatre Guild, Inc. v. Ewing, 421 U.S. 
923 (1975). 
21• 1918 La. Acts, No. 47 § 2, previously codified in LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4712 (1968) 
(repealed 197 4). 
211 Gulf States Theatres, Inc. v. Richardson, 287 So. 2d 480, 485-87 (La. 1974). In response 
to the Gulf States decision, the Legislature repealed the offending statute and substituted 
what seems to be a constitutionally permissible system. 1974 La. Acts, No. 277, § 1, codified 
at LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:4711-16 (Supp. 1976). 
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Two Supreme Court opinions are instructive in this regard. In 
Freedman, the Court said "because only a judicial determination in 
an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to free-
dom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determina-
tion suffices to impose a valid final restraint."220 In Hecht Co. v. 
Bowles221 the Court construed a statute providing that upon the 
required showing an "injunction, restraining order, or other order 
shall be granted" not to compel courts of .equity to depart from 
traditional "qualities of mercy and practicality."222 The judge could 
conclude that the defendant had. breached the substantive stan-
dard, yet, in response to promises to do better, refuse to enjoin.223 
Thus, if the legislature attempts to circumscribe the full range of 
judicial discretion, it may unconstitutionally prevent a judicial de-
termination of obscenity. And in any event, courts of equity retain 
discretion to ignore compulsory remedies. 
The proposed statute preserves the judge's remedial flexibility. 
The jury, if it is demanded, serves solely as a factfinder. When both 
jury and judge find material to be obscene, the judge must enter a 
declaration of obscenity. The declaratory judgment is a full-fledged 
remedy because it gives the decision the force of law, precedential 
value, and res judicata effect. But coercive remedies that must be 
enforced with contempt are a matter of judicial discretion. The 
statute says only that the judge "may enjoin" dissemination. This 
allows the remedial discretion announced in Hecht Co. v. Bowles. 
VI. THE NATURE OF THE FINAL INJUNCTION 
Injunctions contain two parts: they specify who is obliged to 
obey, and what they must do. In his 1897 article entitled 
Government by Injunction, 224 Mr. Dunbar complained, "A looseness 
of thought is apparent in the decisions discussing the use of injunc-
tions which has tended to conceal the principles involved. " 225 The 
following discussion of obscenity nuisance injunctions will attempt 
to avoid Mr. Dunbar's criticism. 
A. Who Must Obey the Injunction? 
The only significant problem in determining who is bound by 
m Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). 
221 321 u.s. 321 (1944). 
222 Id. at 329. 
223 See, e.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 60·62 (1975). 
22
' Dunbar, Government by Injunction, 13 LAw Q. REv. 347 (1897). 
225 Id. at 358. 
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an obscenity injunction is the product of bad doctrine from the turn 
of the century. The in rem injunction, which was used primarily to 
abate saloons, restrained "all persons" from illegal activity on the 
described premises. This permitted a court to hold in contempt any 
person who acted contrary to the injunction, even if he was not a 
party to the suit and was ignorant of the injunction.226 By substitut-
ing constructive notice for actual knowledge, in rem injunctions 
obviated enforcement and proof difficulties. But in so doing they 
created serious due process and first amendment problems. 
Obscenity nuisance statutes sometimes achieve an in rem effect 
by permitting injunctions that restrain both the defendant and the 
property on which the nuisance was discovered.227 Courts have occa-
sionally enjoined "the defendant and all other persons,"228 or "any 
person."229 But, whether the nuisance involves liquor or pornogra-
phy, holding a person in contempt of an injunction of which he has 
no notice violates elemental principles of due process. 230 The first 
amendment probably precludes in rem obscenity nuisances as well. 
In Smith v. California, 231 the Supreme Court reversed a conviction 
under an ordinance that made simple possession of obscene books 
illegal. The Court held that to permit conviction for possession with-
out proof of scienter or knowledge would inhibit freedom of expres-
sion by booksellers. Injunctive theories that attempt to punish peo-
ple who lack knowledge of an interdiction run afoul of the same 
principle. 232 
The proposed statute eliminates in rem injunctions and allows 
the court to enjoin only "any or all defendants." By implication, the 
court cannot "enjoin" the property, nor can it compel nonparties to 
comply. The general law of injunctions goes somewhat further and 
permits courts to punish a defendant's agents or cohorts who violate 
an injunction.233 The author anticipates that courts would use the 
proposed statute to enjoin named defendants, and general equitable 
m See, e.g., Silvers v. Traverse, 82 Iowa 52, 47 N.W. 888 (1891). See generally Rendle-
man, Beyond Contempt: Obligors to Injunctions, 53 TEx. L. REv. 873, 911-16 (1975). 
227 !No. Coo& § 35-30-10.5-4 (1973). 
m See Grove Press, Inc. v. Flask, 326 F. Supp. 574, 578 (N.D. Ohio 1970), vacated, 413 
u.s. 902 (1973). 
221 Speight v. Slaton, 356 F. Supp. 1101, 1104 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (Morgan, J., dissenting), 
vacated and remanded, 415 U.S. 333 (1974). 
%10 See generally Rendleman, supra note 226, at 884-88; Comment, Community Resist-
ance to School Desegregation: Enjoining the Undefinable Class, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 111, 128-
32, 140-43 (1976). 
231 361 u.s. 147 (1959). 
232 State ex rel. Ewing v. "Without a Stitch," 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 101-02, 307 N.E.2d 911, 
916 (1974), appeal dismissed sub nom. Art Theatre Guild v. Ewing, 421 U.S. 923 (1975). 
233 Rendleman, supra note 226. 
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doctrine to prevent defendants from breaching injunctions through 
the use of alter egos or straw men. In no event, however, should the 
court attempt to bind individuals who lack actual knowledge of the 
original injunction. 
B. What May Be Enjoined? 
Commentators traditionally employ two variables in analyzing 
the "what" part of injunctions. 234 The first variable, broad to nar-
row, refers to the amount of conduct the injunction forbids. The 
second variable, imprecise to specific, refers to the particularity 
with which the injunction describes the forbidden conduct. An in-
junction that intrudes upon sensitive first amendment interests 
brings related but distinct concepts into play. An overly broad in-
junction may run afoul of the constitutional proscription of prior 
restraints, and an imprecise injunction may be infirm because it 
violates the constitutional vagueness doctrine. 
Before examining particular types of final injunctions, a further 
word about prior restraint doctrine is required. This article earlier 
divided prior restraints into procedural and remedial restraints, and 
discussed procedural restraints in the section on pretrial proce-
dures.235 Remedial restraints are found in the part of the injunction 
that describes "what" conduct is forbidden. Remedial restraints can 
be further subdivided into "hardcore" restraints and "standards" 
restraints. 
Hardcore restraints prevent future expression because of past 
expression. An example would be: "Because we dislike the May 
issue of the Law Review, you may not publish at all in June." 
Hardcore restraints, when identified as such, seldom cause courts 
any trouble and are almost invariably held unconstitutional. Stan-
dards restraints are illustrated by the well-known decision in Near 
v. Minnesota. 236 A Minnesota public nuisance statute permitted the 
state to enjoin "a malicious, scandalous and defamatory" newspa-
per.237 Near appealed from an injunction that forbade, in part, "any 
publication whatsoever which is a malicious, scandalous or defama-
tory newspaper, as defined by law .... " 238 In other words, the 
injunction simply adopted the standard embodied in the statute, 
without specifying further what content could not be published. The 
23
' Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REv. 994, 1064-67 {1965). 
235 See text and notes at notes 129-157 supra. 
23
' 283 u.s. 697 {1931). 
237 Id. at 702. 
238 Id. at 706. 
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constitutionality of standards restraints in the obscenity nuisance 
context is unclear and will be discussed below. 
To summarize, injunctions may be constitutionally invalid for 
one of three reasons: vagueness, hardcore prior restraint, or stan-
dards prior restraint. The article will turn to litigated obscenity 
injunctions, beginning with the easiest, and apply this frame of 
reference. Because haziness attends prior restraint doctrine, the 
analysis will be greeted with inconstant success. But the frame of 
reference allows some intelligible generalizations to be adduced. 
1. Hardcore Prior Restraints. 
a. Shutdown orders. Many statutes permit obscenity injunc-
tions that close an establishment where pornography has been dis-
seminated, 239 and at least one court has approved such an injunc-
tion.240 Other courts have disapproved requests for shutdown or-
ders.241 A court that closes a business associated with past offensive 
expression effectively prohibits the proprietor from disseminating 
protected materials from that location in the future. 242 Thus, shut-
down orders represent a clear-cut case of hardcore prior restraints. 
Although this would appear to be obvious, the Michigan Court 
of Appeals, in approving the padlocking of a theater for one year, 
nevertheless sought to distinguish a shutdown order from a prior 
restraint. 243 First, the court reasoned, since the defendants remained 
%3' See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 7204 (1976 Supp.); IND. CoDE §§ 35-30-10-5-4, 35-
30-10-56 (1973). The Indiana statute includes complex bonding, taxing, and release provi-
sions which are not discussed herein. The district court reprobated these provisions in 
Nihiser v. Sendak, 405 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ind. 1974), but the Supreme Court vacated and 
remanded over Justice Brennan's cogent dissent. Sendak v. Nihiser, 423 U.S. 976 (1975). 
210 Bloss v. Paris Township, 380 Mich. 466, 157 N.W.2d 260 (1968). 
"' Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 404 F. Supp. 33, 43-44 (S.D. Tex. 1975), 
remanded on other grounds sub nom. Butler v. Dexter, 425 U.S. 262 (1976); General Corp. v. 
State ex rel. Sweeton, 294 Ala. 657, 320 So. 2d 668, 675-76 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 
(1976); People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 59,550 P.2d 600, 610, 
130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 338, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); State ex rel. Blee v. Mohney 
Enterprises, 154 Ind. App. 244, 247-48, 289 N.E.2d 519, 521, (1973); Hall v. Commonwealth 
ex rel. Schroering, 505 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Ky. 1974); New Riviera Arts Theatre v. State, 219 
Tenn. 652, 659-60, 412 S.W.2d 890, 893-94 (1967); Napro Development Corp. v. Town of 
Berlin, 376 A.2d 342, 349 (Vt. 1977). 
"'
2 Speight v. Slaton, 356 F. Supp. 1101, 1107 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (Morgan, J., dissenting), 
vacated and remanded, 415 U.S. 333 (1974); General Corp. v. State ex rel. Sweeton, 294 Ala. 
657, 320 So. 2d 668, 675 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); Sanders v. State, 231 Ga. 
608, 613, 203 S.E.2d 153, 157 (1974). As the court in Sanders points out, a shutdown order is 
also a particularly noxious procedural restraint because the order, without according any 
procedural safeguards, suppresses matter that the defendant could have disseminated in the 
future. I d. See generally Edelstein & Mott, Collateral Problems in Obscenity Regulation: A 
Uniform Approach to Prior Restraints, Community Standards, and Judgment Preclusion, 7 
SETON HALL L. REv. 543 (1976). 
"'
3 State ex rel. Cahalan v. Diversified Theatrical Corp., 59 Mich. App. 223, 237, 229 
N.W.2d 389, 396 (1975), rev'd, 369 Mich. 244, 240 N.W.2d 460 (1976). 
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free to exhibit nonobscene films elsewhere, the padlocking order was 
a sanction for past conduct, rather than a restraint on future con-
duct. Second, because individuals convicted of distributing obscen-
ity could be imprisoned for up to one year, the defendants should 
not be heard to complain about the less severe padlocking sanc-
tion.2H 
. The court's attempt to distinguish shutdown orders from prior 
restraints is unpersuasive. ·whatever the defendants were free to do 
elsewhere, to forbid them access to this facility and equipment re-
stricts their future freedom of communication, and is an ill-
concealed hardcore restraint. Moreover, an analogy to criminal rem-
edies ignores the point that the state may not mete out criminal 
punishment under the reduced protection of civil procedure. If the 
state's interest in closing a building is to exact a punishment for 
past conduct, then it must proceed against the defendant under 
criminal, rather than civil, procedures. Finally, if the offending dis-
tributor rents the building, a padlocking order deprives the build-
ing's owner of property without due process of law.245 
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, 
holding that the authorities could not employ the Redlight Nuis-
ance Statute against motion pictures. While the court did not pass 
on the prior restraint issue, it registered disapproval of the injunc-
tion, since it could be "used to suppress materials not found to be 
obscene."246 The author would prefer a more explicit repudiation of 
the pernicious doctrine of the lower court. 
b. Bonding requirements. Mter finding that obscenity has 
been disseminated, some courts have forced the owner or proprietor 
to post a bond as a condition of keeping the business open. 247 This 
varies the analysis applied to shutdown orders, but does not change 
the result. The bond does not prohibit future conduct because of a 
finding of illegal past conduct; it merely qualifies the defendant's 
first amendment rights by imposing a burdensome condition on 
2U Id. 
215 Gulf States Theatres, Inc. v. Richardson, 287 So. 2d 480, 492 (La. 1973). See State ex 
rei. Keating v. Pressman, 38 Ohio St. 2d 161, 311 N.E.2d 524 (1974) (per curiam); cf. State 
ex rei. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Gladstone, 64 Mich. App. 55, 235 N.W.2d 60 (1975) 
(nuisance abatement statute invoked to close down property being used for purposes of 
prostitution). 
211 State ex rei. Cahalan v. Diversified Theatrical Corp., 396 Mich. 251 n.15, 240 N.W.2d 
460, 464 n.15 (1976). 
2
" See State ex rei. Leis v. WilliamS. Barton Co., 45 Ohio App. 2d 249, 255, 344 N.E.2d 
342, 346 (1975) (per curiam); DEL. ConE ANN. § 7204 (1976 Supp.). But see Universal Amuse-
ment Co. v. Vance, 404 F. Supp. 33, 43-44 (S.D. Tex. 1975), remanded on other grounds sub 
nom. Butler v. Dexter, 425 U.S. 262 (1976). 
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their future exercise. By bearing unequally on different dissemina-
tors of expression, the bond inhibits expression the authorities dis-
like. Such a requirement is equivalent to an unconstitutional at-
tempt to tax knowledge.248 
On the other hand, a bonding requirement tied to an injunction 
against particular material that has been adjudicated obscene 
should be permissible. Such a narrowly drawn bond was approved 
by an Ohio state court of appeals. In an earlier decision, Ohio's 
obscenity nuisance statute had been restricted to enjoining particu-
lar films declared obscene.249 Subsequently, in State ex rel. Leis v. 
William S. Barton Co., 250 the court approved an order requiring a 
bond for the full value of the business to ensure that a film adjudi-
cated to be obscene would not be exhibited there again. This bond-
ing requirement is not a hardcore restraint since it does not use past 
illegal conduct to preclude future nonadjudicated conduct, nor can 
it be said to condition or tax future distribution of presumptively 
protected expression. 251 
This type of limited bonding requirement more closely resem-
bles an injunction that specifies the penalty for violation, or a coer-
cive contempt award where the judge tells the contemnor what it 
will cost to violate again, than a hardcore prior restraint. Of course, 
any bonding requirement ties up assets rather than merely admon-
ishing. But losing litigants traditionally pay taxable expenses for 
marshalls, sheriffs, and witnesses, and the bond premium can be 
conceptualized as part of the price of losing instead of a lien on 
future conduct. Even this narrow form of bonding requirement, 
however, should be limited in duration and open to modification or 
dissolution when conditions change. 
2. Unconstitutional Vagueness. Policymakers frequently 
employ imprecise directives to deal with irreconcilable interests. 
When the General Court in colonial Virginia instructed tavern 
keepers "nor on the Sabbath Day suffer any person to tipple and 
drink more than is necessary,"252 it had in mind the comforts of both 
religion and an occasional nip. But equity requires that injunctions 
2
" Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244-51 (1936). Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 
357 U.S. 513 (1958) (unconstitutionality of denial of tax exemption to veterans who refuse 
loyalty oath). 
211 State ex rei. Ewing v. "Without a Stitch," 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 307 N.E.2d 911 (1974), 
appeal dismissed sub nom. Art Theatre Guild, Inc. v. Ewing, 421 U.S. 923 (1975). 
250 State ex rei. Leis v. WilliamS. Barton Co., 45 Ohio App. 2d 249, 253-55, 344 N.E.2d 
342, 346-47 (1975). 
zs• See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 
233 (1936). 
zsz 6 Hening's Statutes 73 (1748). 
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delineate proscribed conduct with specificity, to avoid both uncer-
tainty about what is forbidden, and excessive discretion in the way 
injunctions are enforced. 253 
Statutory vagueness is a well-known vice of constitutional di-
mension in expression-related areas. Vague injunctions should be 
set aside on constitutional grounds for some of the same reasons. A 
criminal statute must be precise enough to give fair notice of the 
conduct it forbids, and to guide the discretion of enforcement offi-
cials.254 Similarly, an injunction should be clear enough that the 
ordinary person can discern what conduct it proscribes.255 Paris 
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton256 approves injunctions against obscenity, 
"assuming the use of a constitutionally acceptable standard for de-
termining what is unprotected by the First Amendment."257 As a 
matter of course, courts refuse to enforce injunctions that, on their 
face, abridge communication or conduct protected by the first 
amendment. 258 Impermissibly vague injunctions should also be over-
turned as unconstitutional. 259 
Imprecise injunctions nevertheless appear in reported deci-
sions. One enjoined "conducting the business of selling obscene lit-
erature in violation of [the state obscenity statute]";260 another 
forbade the continued existence of the statutory nuisance of obscen-
ity;261 a third interdicted not only certain specific magazines, books 
and items, but also what the court called "similar items";262 a fourth 
enjoined the showing of Lysistrata "or any other motion picture film 
of the same character."263 Blanket injunctions with catch-all phrases 
such as "maintenance of their business so as to annoy the com-
munity" are equitable overkill. The first amendment protects a lot 
253 See generally D. DoBBS, REMEDIES § 2.10 (1973). 
2
" Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972); Walkerv. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1975); 
Attwood v. Purcell, 402 F. Supp. 231, 234-36 (D. Ariz. 1975); F. ScHAUER, supra note 6, at 
158-64. 
:ss See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 437-38 (1976); United 
States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 519 F.2d 1236, 1246 (5th Cir.-1975), cert. denied, 
428 u.s. 910 (1976). 
:so 413 u.s. 49 (1973). 
:s' ld. at 55. 
m United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585-86 (1971). 
:so Paris Follies, Inc. v. State ex rel. Gerstein, 259 So. 2d 532 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) 
(per curiam); Mitchum v. State ex rel. Schaub, 250 So. 2d 883, 886 (Fla. 1971). 
20
" Mitchum v. State, 244 So. 2d 159, 159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971). 
281 Society to Oppose Pornography, Inc. v. Thevis, 255 So. 2d 876, 878 (La. Ct. of App. 
1972). 
202 Moore v. State, 470 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). 
203 Cactus Corp. v. State ex rel. Murphy, 14 Ariz. App. 38, 39, 480 P.2d 375, 376 (1971) 
(per curiam). 
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that will "annoy" some people.264 Such vague injunctions breach the 
fundamental rule, grounded in equity and constitutional law, that 
injunctions must be "definite, clear, and concise."265 
3. Standards Orders. Is an injunction that forbids a defendant 
to disseminate "obscenity" defective when analyzed correctly? 
Such a standards order could, of course, violate the vagueness doc-
trine. If it does, it should be invalidated on this basis. But an order 
that copies the Supreme Court's latest statement of standards 
seems well within the wit of man. If the order is so precise and 
specific that "defendants do not even need a dictionary to learn 
what is prohibited since the parenthetical material following the 
Latin-derived words makes the order clear,"266 then the defendant's 
vagueness attack should fail. 
The more serious question is whether such standards orders are 
constitutionally infirm under the holding of Near v. Minnesota. 267 
Recall that Near invalidated an injunction that prohibited the pub-
lication of a "malicious, scandalous or defamatory" newspaper.268 
The exact reason for the Court's ruling is, however, difficult to dis-
cover. The decision makes little sense if the Court thought that the 
injunction was merely a standards order. The Court assumed that 
penal libel statutes were constitutionally permissible,269 and the 
civil injunction merely personalized a parallel criminal statute. 
Under a standards order, the newspaper could publish, be charged 
with contempt, and defend on the ground that the statements were 
not "malicious, scandalous or defamatory." This is nearly identical 
to the paper defending a criminal libel prosecution by arguing that 
because the statements were not libelous, it had not violated the 
statute. 
Other language in the opinion indicates that the Court viewed 
the injunction as compelling the publisher to clear material in ad-
vance with the judge.270 In other words, the injunction created a type 
of hardcore restraint not unlike an advance licensing scheme. On 
this reading, the key to understanding Near is that it forbids "a 
judgment [that] would lay a permanent restraint upon the pub-
211 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-12 (1975); Coates v. City of 
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971). 
215 Teamsters Union v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Moore v. State, 470 S.W.2d 391, 396 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1971). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d). 
"' Richards v. State, 497 S.W.2d 770, 780 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). 
217 283 u.s. 697 (1931). 
2
" Id. at 701-02. 
211 Id. at 720. 
21• Id. at 706, 712. See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central 
Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 191, 205. 
556 The University of Chicago Law Review [44:509 
lisher, to escape which he must satisfy the court as to the character 
of the new publication."271 Under this interpretation, which the au-
thor accepts, a standards injunction of obscenity that does not put 
the trial court in the role of an advance censor would not violate the 
doctrine of Near. 
In some ju:dsdictions standards orders may be invalid because 
of the rule that equity will not enjoin a crime. 272 The traditional 
ground for the maxim is that the state possesses an adequate rem-
edy at law in a criminal prosecution. In addition, a defendant who 
breaches an injunction that merely personalizes a criminal statute 
may be unfairly exposed to both criminal punishment and con-
tempt.273 Moreover, while a criminal defendant may argue that the 
statute under which he is convicted is unconstitutional, a defendant 
in a contempt proceeding may not challenge the constitutionality 
of the injunction because of the collateral bar rule. 274 Finally, proce-
dural advantages for the state lurk in injunctions personalizing 
criminal statutes. Under present law, a contemnor can be impris-
oned for up to six months without benefit of a jury trial.275 
Nevertheless, most jurisdictions reject these arguments and 
permit courts to issue injunctions against crimes. 276 An injunction 
forbidding "obscenity" or specifying standards is distinguishable 
from criminal punishment because it gives the defendant one free 
bite: a court finds the defendant's activity illegal but withholds 
punishment until he commits a second violation. Thus, the 
"obscenity" or standards injunction grows out of the practice of 
allowing the authorities to choose between civil and criminal reme-
dies. By abolishing the criminal sanction, raising the civil burden 
of proof, and allowing a jury trial of obscenity, the proposed statute 
obviates much of the unfairness of a standards injunction. 
The proposed statute nevertheless allows ·the judge to enjoin 
defendants from disseminating only "matter adjudged to be ob-
scene." This limits injunctions to specific books or films and, by 
implication, forbids a "standards" order. To be sure, a case can be 
made for standards orders. As a Texas court pointed out, if courts 
cannot employ such an injunction, "the State must bring suit each 
time the defendants change the obscene menu in their passion 
271 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 712 (1931). 
271 See, e.g., Richards v. State, 497 S.W.2d 770, 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). 
773 Kuang Hung Hu v. Morgan, 405 F. Supp. 547, 548 (E.D.N.C. 1975). 
m See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 334 (1967) (Warren, C.J., 
dissenting). 
775 Maita v. Whitmore, 508 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1974). 
%7& D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.11 (1973). 
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pits."277 But the author thinks that the argument advanced by Jus-
tices Brennan and Tobriner carries the day. Obscenity and pro-
tected expression are closely related, and the standards for ascer-
taining obscenity are inherently imprecise. If civil obscenity allows 
"standards" injunctions, the authorities could secure a "standards" 
order and threaten the defendant with contempt. Thus, although 
the statute would repeal criminal statutes, the harassing technique 
of threatening prosecution-and the resulting chill on the market-
place of ideas-would reenter by the side door. The proposed statute 
seeks to prevent the authorities from using a "standards" injunction 
to threaten contempt in the same way they may now use penal 
statutes. 278 
vn. PosT-INJUNCTION IssUES 
The article will next consider three issues that arise after a 
judge issues an injunction. First, what principles should govern the 
award of stays pending appeal? Second, what should become of the 
material that is declared obscene? And third, what sanctions should 
courts be permitted to impose for contempt? 
A. Stay Pending Appeal 
Unless an enjoined litigant obtains a stay, the injunction re-
mains in effect pending appeal. As a general rule, either the trial 
court or the appellate court may grant a stay, but appellate courts 
often give considerable deference to trial courts in determining 
whether to stay an injunction.279 The proposed statute adopts ordi-
nary rules of appellate procedure with two exceptions. It requires an 
expedited appeal, and it forces appellate courts to consider indepen-
dently whether to grant a stay. The latter requirement is designed 
to ensure that the propriety of a stay pending appeal is considered 
by a detached tribunal as well as by the trial court. 
m Richards v. State, 497 S.W.2d 770, 781 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). 
77
• If a jurisdiction wants to adopt the statute but allow "obscenity" or "standards" 
injunctions, the legislature should: 
1) amend§ 13 adding "or any other material which is obscene as defined in§ 1." States 
with the equivalent of federal rule 65(d) cannot incorporate by reference but must define 
obscenity in the injunction. 
2) amend § 15 to provide a contempt procedure commensurate with Freedman v. 
Maryland: notice, an adversary judicial determination, brief or no restraints, and a prompt 
decision, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965), in addition to the usual apparatus of criminal contempt. 
771 Mitchum v. State, 234 So. 2d 420 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970). 
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B. Destruction of Obscene Material 
What happens to the books or film prints found obscene? The 
Tennessee Supreme Court declared, "Once a film is judicially deter-
mined to be obscene it becomes contraband and may properly be 
destroyed without violating the rights of anyone."280 Many statutes 
and reported court orders command officials to "seize and destroy" 
~bscenity. 281 Destruction has its roots in the law of deodands, requir-
ing the forfeiture or demolition of objects that offend, injure, or 
kill.282 The Supreme Court approved its use in conjunction with 
adjudicated obscenity in Kingsley Books. 283 Certainly, destruction is 
an obvious solution to the real risk that the enjoined material will 
reappear in the stream of commerce. 
However, burnt offerings and revenge against objects are an-
achronisms. Demolition smacks too much of bookburning, a prac-
tice incompatible with an open and democratic society. Destruction 
of obscene materials is also inconsistent with other facets of obscen-
ity law. Although the Supreme Court has permitted the authorities 
to regulate the dissemination of pornography, private 
"consumption" of legally obscene material is beyond the ambit of 
permissible interdiction.284 Moreover, obscenity doctrine varies 
through space and time. Tolerance for sexually explicit matter may 
flourish under city lights but wither in country air. And if recent 
history is any guide, one generation's "dirty book" is assigned read-
ing for the undergraduates of the next. 
The proposed statute does not allow officials to destroy mate-
rial adjudged·obscene. Although the court may enjoin the defendant 
from disseminating it, the proprietor may keep the matter at home, 
ship it to a more salubrious environment, or wait for the local cli-
mate to change. If time alters· community standards or legal doc-
trine, the defendant may ask the court to modify or dissolve the 
injunction. 285 The statute confronts the risk that the owner will dis-
obey the injunction, but relies on the power of contempt rather than 
a bonfire. 
. """ Taylor v. State ex rel. Kirkpatrick, 529 S.W.2d 692, 698 (Tenn. 1975). 
""' See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAw§ 6330(3) (McKinney 1976). 
""
2 Exodus 21:28: "If an ox gore a man or a woman, 11nd they die, he shall be stoned and 
his flesh not eaten." 
""' Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 444 (1957) . 
.., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
""'FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5); 11 c. WRIGHT &A. MILLER, F'EDERALPRACTICEANDPROCEDURE 
210 (1973). 
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C. Sanctions For Contempt 
Flexibility, the byword of equitable remedies, should guide the 
choice of remedies for contempt. The proposed statute permits the 
court to fine, imprison, or "impose any other lesser appropriate 
sanction" for contempt. Thus, the statute permits retributive sanc-
tions for less than the prescribed maximum. Courts that try crimi-
nal contempt cases should apply the appropriate criminal safe-
guards under the rules and statutes of the jurisdiction. 
In addition, the statute allows the court to use civil contempt, 
either remedial or coercive. Remedial contempt occurs when the 
judge compels a violator to compensate someone damaged by the 
breach of an injunction. Commentators have analogized obscenity 
to assault, 286 and courts should be allowed to use remedial contempt 
to impose "assault" damages on a breaching defendant. Coercive 
contempt occurs when the judge tells a violator to comply with the 
injunction or face a specific penalty, often on a timed basis, for 
continuing to flout the order. Courts should also be able to use 
coercive contempt orders to achieve compliance with civil obscenity 
injunctions. 287 
CoNCLUSION 
The assumption that language can be refined to distinguish the 
obscene from the merely explicit is probably fallacious. Minds can 
identify obscenity, but definition plays a small role in the labeling 
process. The verbal formula adopted in Miller v. California288 pur-
ports to focus the decisionmaker's attention on the issues. But be-
cause obscenity is such a cluster of social and psychological forces, 
definitions are too subjective and morally connotative to bring fair-
ness and predictability to obscenity regulation. 
Obscenity regulation consists of people exercising power over 
people. It is most realistically viewed as a specialized legal process 
whereby authorities specify particular material as being too sexually 
explicit for others, and enforce this decision by imposing sanctions 
for distributing this material. Accordingly, this article has over-
looked definition and has examined the process by which a determi-
nation of obscenity is reached. It has sought to develop a process 
zxo T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 91 (1966). 
m Coercive orders cannot include security or the equivalent of security against any 
future obscenity; this is an impermissible hard core restraint. See State ex rei. Leis v. William 
S. Barton Co., 45 Ohio App. 2d 249, 258-60, 344 N.E.2d 342, 348-50 (1975). 
m See note 5 supra. 
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that makes possible a full and fair accommodation of the competing 
interests and values at stake. 
Civil obscenity is the worst and best of remedies. The equitable 
approach displays execrable excesses: it can render equity the hand-
maiden of the criminal law, turn to clandestine ex parte procedure, 
deprive a defendant of trial by jury, and perpetrate massive seizures 
and shutdowns.289 But equity also exhibits exemplary features: it 
accords a civilized warning, reduces the stigma of state control, and 
focuses on the critical issue of obscenity rather than irrelevant pro-
cedural technicalities. This article and the statute it proposes at-
tempt to eliminate the worst and consolidate the best. The author 
hopes this modest effort will assist in forming a new consensus about 
the appropriate role of the state in regulating sexually explicit ex-
pression. 
28
' See Judge Morgan dissenting in Speight v. Slaton, 356 F. Supp. 1101, 1104·08 (N.D. 
Ga. 1973), vacated and remanded, 415 U.S. 333 (1974); State v. Gulf States Theatres, Inc., 
270 So. 2d 547 (La. 1972), rev'd, 287 So. 2d 496 (La. 1974). 
